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Book Reviews 
A General Rhetoric by Group M (J. Dubois, F. Edeline, J.-M. Klinkenberg, P. 
Minguet, F. Pire, H. Trinon), translated by Paul B. Burrell and Edgar M. 
Slatkin. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1981. 
Pp. xix + 254. $18.95. 
General RbetOf}-ic, first published in 1970, is the product of a group of neo-
rhetoricians from Liege. It is an attempt at a linguistically based synthetic theory 
of poetic figures, the part of rhetoric known as elocutio. The synthetic theory is 
the work's main claim to be "general ))~" general" as in "general linguistic 
theory," i.e. formally articulated, systematic and inclusive. It also claims general-
ity in that the theory gives a unified account of figures at all levels from sound, 
syntax, semantics, refer.ence, to (sketchily) whole text. The authors are less con-
fident about claiming generality in the sense of trans historical or transcultural 
applicability; these extensions are only briefly touched on. As far as any tendency 
to demonstrate ge:l1eralizability is concerned, it must be said that the range of 
literary exemplification is restricted largely to modern and modernist poetry and 
fiction in French and English. Frankly, this limitation is likely to be more than 
fortuitous, since linguistic deviationist theory (to which this is at least close kin) 
has strong affinities with modernist writing. But, anyway, we have no basis for 
deciding whether the theory could be generalized beyond French, or beyond 
modern literature, because Group p. never consider the criteria for valid gen-
eralizability in these senses. What they do tackle, at least to some extent, is the 
question of the validity of their theory for rhetorical phenomena in modes of 
discourse other than "poetry" or "literature": one of the benefits of a linguis-
tics-based theory is that such a question is raised and considered quite naturally. 
Besides non-literary modes of languag.e, such as newspaper 'headlines, some sec-
tions of the book make a semiotic extension to the non-linguistic genres of 
theatre and film. 
As the translators say, this is likely to be a difficult book for anyone ,\1'ho has 
not the relevant background in French (and related) linguistic and semiotic 
theory: Saussure, Benveniste, Hjelmslev, Jakobson, Barthcs, Todorov, Greimas, 
Genette. It is not that the linguistics itself is difficult, but that the distinctions 
and terminology are likely to he unfamiliar to Anglo-Saxon students, and they 
are handled allusively and metaphorically in this book. Clarity is not helped by 
a stilted and unreli,able translation, a matter to which I shall return. 
According to Group p.. literature is a radical transformation of language effected 
by the, application of rhetorical figures or metaboleS'o Allegedly, this transforma-
tion "disqualifies poetry as language" (p. 9), presumably by disrupting referen-
tial communication. This extreme and fanciful notion is encouraged by Jakob-
son's driving a wedge between "poetic" and other uses of language, but for-
tunately Group p. do not leave hold of language entirely, for they are clear that 
a rhetorical figure only works if it is perceived in relation to a presupposed 
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normality-" a metaphor is perceived only if it acts simultaneously in the usual 
sense and in the figured sense. It is, therefore, the norm-deviation r.elationship, 
and not the deviation as such, that makes style" (p. 15). "Norm" or "degree 
zero" is very hazily characterized by the Group; their intuitive base-line is, 
judging by references, scientific prose or writing about the history of science, but 
they also admit that degree zero is an idealization, not a specific style: denotation 
without connotation, language discounting all but the essential units of significa-
tion (pp. 30-31). 
The metaboles or figures which transform discourse are detected alterations 
of these essential units. They work like Riffaterre's "stylistic devices": they are 
local eca7ts which are unexpected, hold up the reader's linear progress through 
the, text and require response and interpretation (p. 38). The enemy of this kind 
of deviation is convention: a deviation arrests the reader and requires response 
if it is a marked departure from G. continuous norm; but if a particular type of 
deviation is repeated often, it will enter into the constitution of the norm and 
lose its force. The Group's psychological/aesthetic theory is extended by cer-
tain speculations about aesthetic effects (Ch. 6). A metabole or stylistic device 
is a stimulus to aesthetic response (" ethos "). But metaboles are aesthetically 
polyvalent: the exact response will depend on the relation of the metabole to its 
stylistic macrocontext in Riffaterre's sense, the patterned organization of the text 
as a whole. 
This framework of assumptions about" poetic language" is, frankly, common-
place, solidly located within the. context of ideas familiar through the work of 
Shldovsky, Jakobson, Mukarovsk)r, Riffaterre and others. Since the book does 
not offer itself as criticism-the texts cited being merely fragments exemplifying 
types of figurer--wherein lies the work's originality or, what part of literary stud-
ies does it facilitate? The answer can only be the way in which it is suggested 
that a taxonomy of rhetorical figures be derived. The aim of Group p, is to 
present a unified explanation of figures as applications of a small number of con-
sistent operations to specific structures of language. Thus, the basis of the 
rhetorical classification is an account of the levels of language, abstractly con-
sidered, from phonetics through morphology, syntax, semantics, to text structure 
and pragmatics; of the relationships between levelsj and of the units found at each 
level (distinctive features, sentences, phrases, lexemes, etc.). The linguistic model 
used is attributed to Benveniste; it is a very traditional linguisic thory, and :in 
This book it is articulated in very general tenns: the linguistic basis is sound but 
very much lacking in details. For example, a "distinctive feature" approach to 
phonology and to semantics is implied, but there is no justification of a feature 
analysis, nor any detailed indication of what kinds of features are assumed to 
enter into phonetic or semantic decomposition. Such lack of detail about the 
status of sp.ecific units at the different levels is a serious shortcoming for anyone 
who wishes to use Group p,'s methods, since it is never exactly clear to what kinds 
of linguistic entities the metabole-producing operations apply. However, this 
v.agueness does not invalidate the system, for the details could be supplied in a 
more precise linguistic model. It does mean, however, that much of the analysis 
in the book has to be taken on trust, intuitively. 
The final piece of apparatus is the set of operations which are applied to 
linguistic units to produce rhetorical figures (pp. 40-44). These are loosely Ilna-
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legalls to transformations in transformational-generative grammar, but they have 
a different function: not to generate grammatical structures but to "break rules 
or invent new ones" (d. p. 40). Four operations are proposed: suppression of 
some unit, whether a constituent such as a syllable or a word, or a feature; addi-
tion of a unit; suppression-addition which amounts to substitution; and permu-
tation which governs figures such as syntactic inversion. These operations pro-
duce different classes of figure depending on the level of linguistic structure to 
which they are applied; here Group p, indulge in some fairly priddy neologisms: 
metaplasms are transformations of phonological and morphological units, meta-
taxes are figures acting on the syntactic structure of the sentence, metasememes 
are semantic alterations, and finally metalogisms alter the logical value of sent-
ences, their relationship with the world outside language. 
Combining the plan of linguistic levels with the various types of rhetorical op-
eration produces a categorization of rhetorical figures which is tabulated on p. 
45: e.g. metataxes involving suppression include ellipsis, zeug;ma, asyndeton, para-
taxis; metalogisms with addition include hyperbole, and so on. Chapters 2-5 dis-
cuss and extensively illustrate figures at each of the four levels; Chapter 6 is, as 
already indicated, a preliminary discussion of aesthetic effects associated with 
figures. The remaining two chapters, under the heading" Toward a General 
Rhetoric," discuss figures of narrative voice and narrative structure, organizing 
the account by reference to the same operations of suppression, addition, etc., 
with illustrations from theatre and film as well as prose fiction. I do not think 
that this extension of the system adds anything new to the insights of the more 
established structuralist writings on such topics as point of view, plot structure, 
etc., and it is less sophisticated than the work of such writers as Barthes and 
Genette. 
Finally there is "Afterword: Rhetorical Mirrors: Seven Years of Reflection" 
in which the authors enter into debate with some criticisms of the first edition 
of the book. They concede some limitations; but A General Rhetoric remains 
an ingenious and linguistically provocative work which promises the basis of a 
universal, systematic rhetoric, and which deserves further discussion and develop-
ment. It remains now to consider the usefulness of this new English translation. 
I find the French structuralists and post-structuralists just as difficult in Eng-
lish translation as in French. The stylistic playfulness, the fanciful neologisms and 
the dependence on imprecise spatial metaphors are not simplified by renderings 
into one's own language-they are JUSt more distracting. In fact, Rbhorique 
generale is not extravagantly stylized in these respects, and it is a good subject 
for translation. The forbidding difficulty might have been the reliance on ex-
amples drawn from modern French poetry. The translators have had to decide 
in each case whether ra translation of the French illustrative citation would pre-
serve the figure and make the point, or whether a new English example should 
be substituted. On the whole they have coped well with this part of their task, 
substituting well-chosen English examples where necessary (mainly in the areas 
of metaplasms and metasememes) and translating prose, syntactic, examples where 
the point does not get lost. Granted, one could quibble with some examples: for 
instance, the discussion of "a tour unforgettable of Italy" and similar examples 
of adjective-placement; which is invalidated by the fact that the rules are quite 
different in English and French, or the trivialization of Comeille's reverberant 
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m ... ymoron obscure clarte by translating it, unidentified, as "cloudy clarity" (pp. 
66 and 123). But on the whole the ex<amples are effective; it is the translation of 
the text itself which is unsatisfactory. 
One is alerted to the possibility of mechanical errors by mistakes in quoted 
French early in the book: "significant" for significant (p. xvi), "haineus" for 
baineuse (p. 2). I am not an expert on translation from French, but it does seem 
to me that many words and phrases have been mis-rendered through failure to 
relate the text to the context of argument it presupposes. Why, for example, is 
n§cit translated as "short story" on p. 18? It surely has the very general mean-
ing "narrative," as elsewhere in the book, and generally in French narratology. 
On p. 20 the phrase" these very things" translates les cboses memes which in my 
judgment of the context means I( things themselves"; certainly the "these" is 
wrong in its suggestion of reference to some co-textual antecedent. On p. 31 we 
have "the literary act" for Ie fait litteraire. Fait can mean" act," but not here: 
the Group is discussing lexicostatistical proposals for describing the "fact" or 
" essence n of literariness. The translators vacillate between "act" and "fact II 
in many similar contexts, but "act" gives the wrong impression because the 
Group are not concerned with a pragmatic, actional theory of literature as, for 
instance, Ohmann, Pratt and others have been. In the same sentence there ap-
pear to be a quite ludicrous error: des listes de fdquence dites "normales" is 
rendered "frequency lists called normales" instead of "frequency lists said to 
be normal" or in better English" lists of frequencies said to be normal." For a 
final example of mistranslation due to insensitivity to the context of argument, 
see p. 28: une collection de traits distinctifs bierarcbise5 becomes "a collection 
of hierarchically distinctive features" (their italics). This misrepresents lin-
guistic theory-distinctive features may be hierarchically ordered, but it is mean-
ingless to say that they are hierarchically distinctive. 
Apart from mechanical errors, there are three sources of difficulty with 
this translation. First, there is a literal and unidiomatic adherence to French 
syntax: "the impossibility of constructing sentences semantically contradictory" 
(p. 123) is not English; it is a slavish relexicalization of the well-formed French 
l'interdiction de construire des phrases sbnantique111ent contradictoires. English 
must prepose the adjective phrase (" semantically contradictory sentences") or 
mark it as a relative clause (I( sentences which are semantically contradictory"). 
This is a very typical example of misplacement of adjectival and adverbial 
phrases, 2nd failure to mark relative clauses, which makes the translation not only 
stylistically alien but ,also difficult to decode. A second difficulty is unreliability 
of cohesion between sentences and clauses, a lack of care to ensure that items 
such as noun phrases refer to clearly identifiable antecedents. I could not under-
stand the folIo-wing until I looked up the French: 
A theory of linguistic levels has been developed by Benveniste. We 
shall apply it here in a somewhat more general aspect, which will better 
suit our remarks. Whether this application is on the plane of signifier 
(phonic or graphic element) or of the signified (meaning), the chain 
that is manifested can be considered a hierarchy of planes where discrete 
units are 'articulated' (p. 25). 
On connait la theorie des niveaux, developpee par Benveniste: nous lui 
donnons iei un aspect un peu plus general, convenant mieux a notre 
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propos. Que ce sait sur Ie plan du significant (phonique on graphique) 
ou sur Ie plan du signifie (sens), la chaine manifestee peut chIe COll-
sideree camme nne hierarchie de plans, ou s' "articulent" des unites 
discretes. 
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The second sentence means simply" Whether on the plane of the signifier ... "; 
the translators have unjustifiably introduced the phrase "this application," spuri-
ously cohering with "'apply" and diverting attention from the theme of the 
sentence, which is la chaine manifestee and its hierarchy of levels. This sort of 
fault makes one suspect that the translators arc tackling their job sentence by 
sentence vlith a precarious grasp of the drift of the ongoing argument. 
Finally, compounding their own errors, the translators give the reader insuf-
ficient help by rendering the vague and half-metaphorical terms of structuralist 
French by equally vague English equiv;alents. Although I am familiar with struc-
turalist theory, I still need help with this dense paragraph: 
NOlls n'oublions pas qu'on a pu reajuster la these saussurienne de l'arbi-
traire du signe, en montrant que. pour Ie sujCt parlant, rien n'est plus 
necessaire que la connexion du significant et du signifie. Cependant, Ie 
signe lui-meme, par-dela sa dualite constitutive, est distinct du referent: 
Ie sens dernier du discours commun est bien dans cette visee des chases, 
ala fois absentes (Ie mot n'est pas la chose) et presentes (Ie mot remplace 
la chose). 
We are not forgetting that the Saussurian thesis of the arbitrariness of 
the sign can be adjusted by showing that for the speaker nothing is more 
necessary than the connection between the signifier and the signified. Be-
yond its constitutive reality [sic], however, the sign itself is distinct from 
the referent. The ultimate meaning of ordinary discourse is certainly in 
this design of things, at once absent (the word is not the thing) and 
present (the word replaces the thing). (pp. 21-22) 
The mistranslation" reality" for duerlitJ confuses, but this is not the whole prob-
lem. A more expansive and explanatory translation (perhaps footnoted more), 
particularly in explicating such hard-working non-technical terms as visee, would 
have been very welcome. As it is, the translation is accessible only if one pays 
continuous attention to the original for such clarification as can be derived from 
the French. 
ROGER FOWLER 
University of Eerst Anglia 
Saving the Text: Litererture/Derrida/Philosophy by Geoffrey H. Hartman. Balti-
more and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Pp. vi + 184. 
$12.95. 
Ten years ago, an English transLation of critical analyses of "modem" music 
first appeared in print, Boulez on Music Today, an unremittingly witty and pole-
mical analysis of its subject. The work is formalist but also personal, and is a 
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precise though fragmentary autobiography of a disciplined musical rhapsode 
pursuing the task of analytic criticism. Several of these same strengths arc pres-
ent in Hartman's book of literary, psychological, and philosophical comment. 
One of the first things to strike the reader's eye is Hartman's exempla of 
modern art by Adami, Magritte, Oldenburg, Lombardo, Boulee. The book's 
cover is a light blue chroma print of Rene Magrittc's Le donzaine d'Arnheim, a 
heightened and simultaneously bathetic parody of the genre of "mountain paint-
ing" and an expression of the" Olympian mind." In its serious aspects, the pic-
ture recalls Shelley's A10nt Blanc as a destruction of the pallid analogy maldng 
of topographical verse preceding him. However, that determined stance is too 
difficult to sustain: in the picture, the mountainous head of an eagle is a profile 
against the horizon; the wings are the cascade of snow and ice falling to the val-
ley below. A nest of three eggs rests on a plane surface, a balcony, sill, or wall in 
the fore,ground "before" the vlewer. As with much of Magritte, this is an 
elaborate conceit of signifier-signified, such as a painting of a room like his witty 
Personal Values, or of a pipe which imitates commercial art in the realistic im-
pression of a tobacconist's sign, a "painting" which is entitled, This is Not a 
Pipe. Of tlus celebration of illusion, Hartman writes: 
Had Derrida begun his career with Glas Of the essay on Adami, our 
perplexed judgment could hardly have avoided raising the issue of Man-
nerism, or of the resurgence of wit ... in philosophy. In modern art this 
resurgence has been an obvious feature for som~ time. Magritte ... can 
create a new "domrune enchante" by jokes that question the frame 
though not the force of art. (35) 
Indeed, Derrida's texts and this explication are inescapable signals of the change 
of modern literary temperament. Several forms of older literary modernism did 
not much feature the play of ingenuity but did emphasize anxiety and collective 
guilt, and its artists are descendants of Georg Buchner and Dostoevski. It in 
some ways concludes with Sartre's novels and short stories, the characterization 
of assassins, bigots, voyeurs, bourgeosie with limited consciousness, narrow per-
ceptions, and" bad faith." Sartre's fiction celebrates the devious as antidote and 
antitype. Lesage's Gil BIas is ironically figured in Nausea, which is in part a 
polemic against the tailored appetites and stitched histories of the middle class. 
Collections of some kinds of "modemism" often include heavy doses of guilt 
and anti-intellectualism, two crops assiduously cultivated before the academic 
troubles of a decade-and-a-half to a decade ago. An anthology introduction to 
Dostoevski's Notes From the Underground suggests that readers, after initial 
repulsion, then incredulity, then fascination, will perhaps identify with the anti-
hero. Irving Howe provides a nine-point outline symptomatic of the year of 
publication, 1968. I quote the first three and the last points of summary: 
Intelligence is a disease from which man cannot escape: it dooms him to 
self-pride and nCl'I'cissism. 
Man is hopelessly split between the side of himself that wishes to act cmd 
the side that wishes to observe. 
It is often impossible to make a clear distinction bet·ween man's pride and 
his humility: one masks the other. 
What redeems life and gives it meaning is human suffering, an experi-
ence which, in its fullness of conscioumess, is possible only to mankind. 
-Classics of Modern Fiction, pp. 9-10. 
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The other form of "modernism" now in question is the critical writing of 
the 1940's and 1950's which strained after the favorite terms of Cleanth Brooks, 
irony and paradox. TIns was a popular but insular movement, largely confined 
to America, pardy evangelical, essentially didactic, often ahistorical and con-
tentedly ignorant of contextuality. Those trained in the American PhD factory 
of the 1950's and 1960's have anecdotes about the process, often of an instructor 
with the "text alone" who would chart meanings for a semester without con-
textual rudder or compass. I recall one lecture about "swan-boats" as though 
they were from Wagner instead of Boston. David Daiches has his own example: 
an essay by the American poet Delmore Schwartz on Yeats's "Among School 
Children." Schwartz, ignoring context for the sake of ingenuity, misreads" taws" 
as a scrap of Aristoteleanism instead of simple leather: "The taws or marbles 
would be the concentric spheres which constitute the world for Aristotle and to 
which the Prime Mover gives impetus or movement." Daiches says that this 
U fancy speculation" is "unmitigated rubbish" as is Schwartz's misplay with 
"soldier" and "solider" (English Literature, pp. ]6 passim). 
Some of the resentment shown Derrida's "deconstruction" arises from such an 
academic boscage: p.art of the entanglement is from the highly elaborated fiction 
of an often pejorative" realism"; the other is from the stolid doctrine of the 
text itself, which was often celebrated with some intelligent discussion. Indeed, 
the reader of Hartman's analysis of Derrida may feel the subliminal tug of the 
teD(tual memories of Brooks's W ell Wrought Urn. So what are the differences? 
Schwartz's tagging and pulling of Yeats may appear to be a methodic predecessor 
to what some would call the antics of the new, new critical school. However, 
very few past critical essays approach the subtlety of the following, quite re-
markable for what it avoids, the overt sexual references that are very nearly in-
cessant in the pre-canonic Dean's poetry. Hartman writes: 
Donne ends with two uses of the same image, as if a double coda, a 
double act of sealing, were required. The doubling increases our aware-
ness that the image is only an image, the emblematic product of an im-
aginative faith. It is perishable and may need further shoring up. The 
ending, unabsolute, provides a simulacrum of faith, just as parting is a 
simulacrum of death. When we recall the initial stanza, which hangs 
the evidence of life on a word, on less than a word, on a vocal inflection 
Dr quantity, the difference between <l now 11 and" no"-
As virtuous men passe mildly away, 
And whisper to their soules, to goe, 
Whilst some of their sad friends doe say, 
The breath goes now, and some say, no: 
-then this tandem image is a whisper finely extended, airy despite its 
solidity. It is only as affecting and perishable as all words that are breath. 
(153-4) 
Unlike the didactic evangelism of the "new" criticism, this passage takes its 
strength from several sources, Derrida, perhaps, certainly Freud, and unexpected-
ly, such works as Gerardus van der Leeuw's on the phenomenology of religion. 
In Sacred and Profane Beauty, the Dutch scholar writes: "A work of art strives 
for independent life. The object does not matter. Whether the dove of the Holy 
Ghost is painted, or the dove of the gutter, whether one paints a still life of 
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bread and a cup, or calls to mind the holy symbols of the Eucharist, the attempt 
to penetrate to the ultimate reality of what is represented will always lead to 
another re.ality, to a second form." As Hartman also sees, one of the essential 
constituents of Derrida is the elaboration of this perception through the media 
of extensive lmowledge, awareness, and a re-reading of Freud which liberates 
the writer from mere formula. 
Derrida's Glas is informed, stamped, penetrated with phallic ambiguities, the 
columns of text compared with erect memorials to the dead. Freud consistently 
celebrated the acts of detection (perhaps in part to qualify as the designee of 
"scientist"), noting the conscious and subconscious acts of analogy, the acts of 
partial recognition and comparison in puns and metonymy. One of the major 
differences between the now dated New Criticism and the Insistently Contem-
poraneous is the admission that the innate dynamism of language and thought is 
not an aberration, is indeed a process too complex for mere "irony" and" para-
dox." There is no fixed or eternal utterance except that in suspicious dogma, the 
pathetic masquerade of permanence. What unequivocally separates and identi-
fies criticism of this present school is that Brooks and his colleagues of the New 
Criticism usually accepted secular evangelism as ther.apy, not as a symptom of 
complexity to be rigorously and scrupulously examined. Suggesting that there 
are meanings hidden from the writer or speaker is therefore a suspicious demon, 
extremely anti-hierarchical and heterodox. Most certainly, Freud is not" Chris-
tian." Patently, deconstruction celebrates Freud's perceptions in such works as 
the Psychopathology of Everyday Life, where puns and mishearings arc clues to 
quintessential states of mind hidden from the interlocutors themselves. Indeed, if 
Schwartz had developed the idea of "soldier" Axistotle mth his legions of cri-
tical absolutists, his comment would have risen above academic CUt and paste 
categories. Aristotle may be "solder," but in the academy he is also" soldier," 
a fit model for naive legions. Forty years ago, such candid arabesques were 
punished with spankings, academic dunkings or burnings (metaphorical, of 
course), enough to make commentators mask their insights with temperate man-
ners and polite utterances. However, in Derrida and Hartman, the main impulse 
is the celebration of difference, the analysis of levels of consciousness without re-
sort to falsely unifying theories of language, psychology, or criticism. In Glas, 
the levels of consciousness are giycn graphic form, with n:vo columns of text on 
two different subjects, Hegel and Genet, each with marginal commentary. So the 
"text itself" disappears as Derrida refutes that particular fiction with a critical 
manifest exemplifying its own irresolution. 
The dimensions of this critical act alarm some academicians to an hysterical 
level. One commentator, twice published in recent issues of The, American 
Scholar, has repeatedly asked that the critical text deal with" reality," by which 
he means a graphing of univocal statement. Nonetheless, any utterance changes 
v/ith the variation of context. Even the scholarly article plays with several 
stages of meaning. The notes are themselves counter-texts, addenda to a body 
of argument which itself is a comment relative to previous notation. The dis-
ingenuous appearance of stability is seductively simple, but only in a monogamous 
sense. With critical commentary that pretends to be absolute, it is best not to 
ask about the relation of what critics intend to write, what they do write, or 
,vhat they conceal through accident or conscious intention. It is also best not to 
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think of the levels of contextuality, the other works, the environments of the 
subjects themselves, all of which affect interpretation. 
For the dogmatic critic, it is also best not to observe the innately metonymic 
aura of language, its inability to be controlled by one grammatical, critical, or 
philosophical system. For not only are words as unstable as the complex of 
breath, brain, tongue and mouth uttering them, they are each miniature his-
tories of often irrational associ-arion, unintentional me.taphors of partial under-
standings and misrepresentations. Such tenns as II leaves" of a book, or antho-
logy-" flower-gathering "-should remind a reader of this rich instability: its 
generosity and unpredictability are in every term of the language. Part of the 
spirited deviousness of Derrida's "La pharmacie de Platon," as Hartman observes, 
is its potential ambivalence: Derrida "argues that Plato looked on writing as a 
drug whose effects could not be controlled: words are potentially good medicine 
... but when written down they become poison for the mind" (119). This is no 
mere demonic conceit: the Greek pharmakon means either drug, poison, or po-
tion. Throughout Glas, the titular term is used in its manifold sense of death 
toll, glass, ice. The last two are of course reflective, as are in a different sense 
the derivations from the homophones ghel,n,b each of which split into meanings 
as various as celandine, nightingale (from geJge, to yell, to sing),n as well as 
meanings such as gold, gleam, gloss, glissade, or appropriately for the "eagle-
Hegel" pWl in Glas, glida or kite,b a gliding, hovering bird. Essential to under-
standing this form of esprit and geist is the recognition that etymology is itself 
composed of metonyms, those imaginative germs of other tropes. 
Haronan's commentary shows an ingeriUity merited by the multi-lingual erudi-
tion of Derrida, a peripatetic Jewish, Algerian, French theorist well-versed in 
Freud and German and French philosophy. His learning is use.d not as a scho-
lastic buttress but as potential for intellectual flight, conception, and reproduction. 
In Glas, German and French, Hegel (archphilosopher, system builder, punster) 
and Genet (fundamental lover and outcast, victim, criminal, artist) are the two 
textual columns of sacred and profane. The virtuosity of Hartman's own com-
mentary far transcends older examples of explicative wit, such as Ian Watt's 
commentary on the opening of The Ambassadors which was once held up as 
an unassailable example of critical ingenuity. In this instance, the gnomon of 
Hartman's commentary is a witty elaboration, though in formal narrative, of an 
intricately elusive dial-text: 
Moreover, in the same marginal comment where the Sa makes its ap-
pearance, Derrida "invents" another acronym, Ie, for the Immaculate 
Conception . • . . [A] gain, as with Sa, another near homophone is in-
volved, so that language seems to motivate itself, as in the paragrams of 
Saussure. Ie is close to the ici of "ici, maintenant" ... gliding via its 
sound-shape into a concept and so echo-deconstructing it. The doctrine 
of the Ie is ·simply an ici writ large, the exemplary instance for Western 
tradition of a metaphysics of presence. (61) 
Perhaps more than a few readers, .even "trained" or "sophisticated II ones, 
flee in panic before Derrida's and Hartman's pyrotechnics. Two assurances may 
aid the fearful: one, again, is the elusive na.ture of etymological gener.ation, words 
associated with categorical associations, soun~s misheard, mispronounced. Walker 
Percy in an essay published over twenty years ago noticed an amusing and in-
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DOcent mishearing in the American South, where rural blacks referred to juke i ~ 
boxes, manufactured by Seeburg, as "Sea Birds." As Percy realized, this is the. 'I 
radical essence of imaginative language. Because I write this shordy after Ameri~ i i lat 
~ ~a;!~=ia~; :~:dt~u:a~sta; :~gt:n:;ef::~:;r:;:;~or:~:~es ~f:~ :1 
lender has scant hope of repayment. Reference to any adequate etymological list~ tn 
ing confirms such irrational-rational relationships, floating half-determinately in I UI 
consciousness and record. ' : 
Hartman is one of the small band of critics who realizes the power, joy, and 
pain of these tangential and dynamic relations of language, consciousness, and 
accident-all necessary constituents of contemporary literary criticism if it avoids 
3' past of narrowly overdete.rrnined literalism. Such an achievement, without the 
guilt and anxiety of the older "modernism," is alone worth the interdisciplines 
of critical literacy. The almost final words of this essay should be those of the 
expositor himself: 
pr 
G 
From the start of Glas, then, we are presented with two illusory moments 
of ecstatic identification some eighteen hundred years apart: absolute :/ OJ 
knowledge, or Hegel's vision of an end to dialectic and alienation in the 
thought process of the philosopher who has internalized history; and the 
phantasm of the Immaculate Conception. (104) 
Part of this explanation has already been briefly quoted, and it observes that 
language is not immaculate, any more than the phallic columns and their analogy 
of literary tumescence the critic describes or helps inform. Derrida, however, 
has given a description of language that reaches into simple and directly observ- n 
able acts of speech and writing. Like the use of the body, the acts of language i 11 
may assume) degrees of guilt. But it can no longer be said that the disciplines of 't 
language Ql1d of criticism lead but inevitably to fonns of anxiety tha.t are beyond 
analysis and description. Rather, criticism of Hartman's perception celebrates the 
generation of meanings and physical v-ariety itself in their high and low, spiritual 
and physical acts. In his commentary, Hartman neatly demonstrates the limits of 
the guilt of Oedipus: oddly, ludicrously, imaginatively, paronomasia is as potent 
a literary figure as parricide. 
State University College of 
New York, Oneonta 
ROBERT MoYNIHAN 
Emilesse Worke: Spenser and the Structures of Discourse by Jonathan Goldberg. 
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Pp. XV 
+ 177. $14.50. 
One purpose of this study of The Faerie Queene is to examine in detail Book 
Four as paradigmatic of the concerns of the poem as a whole. Given the lack 
of allegorical material in this book, it is not unexpected that the author should 
eschew allegorical interpretation and take as his subject its narrative dimension. 
A Eecond purpose is to fire an opening barrage along the Spenser front, in the 
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spreading war over what critical dispensation is to inherit Renaissance studies. 
This is :t "deconstructive reading of The Faerie Queene," a label I put in quo-
tation marks because they reflect the self-consciousness of the study's challenge 
to Spenser studies, and to the Spenserians eminent and otherwise who have made 
their reputations and part of their living elucidating Spenserian allegory through 
traditional historicist methods. The Spenserians Goldberg does not cite are many. 
and they are surely intended to notice these absences. The one scholar who is 
consistently mentioned with approbation is Harry Berger, Jr., although even 
here Goldberg must qualify indebtedness, which is more to occasional inter-
pretive details than to Berger's governing archaeological schema. Central to 
Goldberg's rejection of traditional readings of F. Q. is his conviction of "the im-
possibility of reducing Spenser's text to one-to-one allegorical meanings, or to 
new-critical coherent pattelTIS of image, or to a thematics that makes the poem 
a set of commonplaces of Renaissance or Christian thought" p. (xiv). Since these 
constitute collectively the major enterprise pursued by Spenser scholars, Gold-
berg's polemical intention could not be clearer. 
Displacing the commonplaces of Renaissance and Christian thought are what 
I' one is tempted to call the commonplaces of deconstructive thought. Goldberg's 
authorities are Roland Barthes (of 5/Z), Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Denida. 
To the first he owes his notion of the readerly versus the writerly text; to the 
second the concept of the self as radically and irretrievably displaced by the text 
of the Other; and he is indebted to the third's development of the concepts of 
deferral, of supplementation, and of dissemination. To all three taken collective-
ly Goldberg owes the collapsing of writer and reader into the text that they 
make and that (un)makes them, a text that constitutes and reflects back to both 
the frustration of desire for closure, for meaning, and for self-identity. 
Goldberg attempts to describe "the narrative principles that induce frustra-
i cion, that deny closure, but that also produce the disturbed and disturbing nar-
rative procedures of Spenser's text" (xii). What frustrates the reader of F. Q. 
are the following: (1) no story proceeds to closure; (2) stories are interrupted by 
stories, and characters fade into and are displaced by other characters; (3) like 
the reader's frustra,ted desire for closure, the desires of the various lovers and 
questcrs are frustrated as well; (4) finally, the writer's desire for patronage at 
court is frustrated by a coy sovereign-figured in Belphoebe-who desires all to 
desire her but frustrates the desires of all and disables (i.e., castrates) those who 
woo elsewhere. The purpose of the poem is to teach the frustration of desire 
and the desire for frustration. 
Illustrative of one or more of these topics are the various episodes the author 
examines: the reopening of the closure to the Scudamour-Amoret tale at the 
beginning of Book Four; the shifting identities of writer, muse, and addressee in 
the stanzas that preface Book One; the failure to reach the intended conclusion 
of Chaucer's Squire's Tale in the story of Cambell and Canacee; Timias' reduc-
tion to speechlessness by Belphoebe; the wounds of unsatiated desire inflicted on 
Britomart and other womeni the destructiveness of desire that Scudamour dis-
covers in the Temple of Venus. 
I am in sympathy with both purposes of this study, for I agree ... 'lith Goldberg 
that F. Q. has been concealed too long under the layers of allegorizing that the 
naive historicism of traditional Spenserians has imposed on it. And I agree also 
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that a deconstructive approach to the poem can yield impressive results. lV1y 
doubts about the success of Goldberg's own dcconstIuctive strategies derive from 
some radical equivocations in these strategies that Goldberg neither resolves nor, 
had he recognized and used them for their heuristic value, exploits. 
I can best begin by questioning a programmatic statement that occurs early 
in the book: "criticism has, in trying to make the task of reading [F. Q.J easier, 
often forgotten to account for what made it difficult in the first place" (xiv). 
And yet, not one of the disruptions and frustrations that Goldberg uncovers are 
things that the traditional reader finds "difficult in the first place." Goldberg's 
is clearly a "second reading," one that has already gone beyond the apparently 
"easy» henneneutic closures ,and allegorical recuperations one derives in a "first 
reading," and has discovered the disruptions and frustrations of the text. For 
Goldberg, most Spenserians presumably do nothing but repeat their first readiqgs, 
treating F. Q. as a readerly text 'available to just such closures and recuperations. 
The deconstructive reader on the other hand reads it as a writerly text, the text 
tha,t Goldberg gives us in his commentary, relishing his own frustration and 
thereby exhibiting his interpretive cunning. And yet, the projected reader of 
F. Q. that Goldberg assumes is and must be continually surprised by the dis-
ruptions and frustrations of the text: he is a reader whose frustrations depend; 
upon his reading's .always being a "first reading." There is something fishy and 
inauthentic about a reader who is continually surprised but is never surprised at 
being continually surprised, a reader full at once of guilelessness, cunning, and 
therefore of bad faith. He tries to read F. Q. as if it were a readerly text, only 
to discover his own failures. As a consequence, he must also read F. Q. as if it 
were a writerly text, registering an awareness that the text is frustrative by de-
sign. But if this is the case then-lacking careful theoretical adjustments-Gold-
berg's reader and his reading both become inherently impossible: if one sees F. Q. 
as frustrative by design, then one is no longer frustrated (nor surprised at being 
so); one can in fact write a book called Endlesse W orke, in which the failure 
of narrative ·and hermeneutic closure becomes itself meaningful. 
Lying behind these equivocations is Goldberg's indecision about the kind of 
text F. Q. is. On the -one hand, he treats the poem as a writerly text, one de-
liberately intended by Spenser to "deconstruct itself," and in tllls case Gold-
berg's o\vn text only makes explicit a type of reading intended by Spenser him-
self. On the other hand, if as he' says, F. Q. offers the reader the twin lures of 
characters that appear mimetic and allegory that appears recuperable, then F. Q. 
is a readerly text, on which a deconstructive reading must operate at a level 
more radical th:m the poet's intention, to disclose fissures in the poem's struc-
tnres that these lures are presumably intended to mask. This indecision is based, 
I suspect, on Goldberg'S apparent assumption that if F. Q. is a. writerly text it 
cannot also be a readerly text. On the contrary, for him F. Q. appears as the 
btter only to those traditional Spenserians who succumb to "first reading" temp-
tations of allegorical interpretation, whereas it is the "second reading" of the 
deconstructionist which discovers that these temptations are false and frustrated, 
leading him to conclude that such temptations ought to be refused because-
they are not there! 
Which brings me to Goldberg's radical misplacing of the poem's allegory. 
Allegory is not, as he says it is, imposed by historicist readers as "an abstrac-
ad 
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tion" which substitutes "for the name of a character, thereby leaving behind 
the narration and its actors for the sake of meaning" (76). That is, allegory is not 
primarily a transaction between figured text and literalizing reader, but a trans-
action that occurs within: the poem itself, particularly in Books One and Two 
where Redcrosse and Guyon exhibit radical problems in interpreting the allegori-
cal characters and places they encounter. In other words, allegory and its 
inteDpretation are one of Spenser's subjects, something that he problematizes for 
his characters even as he problernatizes them for the reader. And it is the 
former who are first frustrated by evanescence of meaning, even as they tempt 
the reader to draw meanings out of their own actions and interpretations. Al-
though Goldberg is correct in saying that allegorical interpretation is only sub-
stituting one figure for another (ibid.), he misses the full implication of dus 
I statement, JUSt as he misses the contradiction internal to his rejection of the 
"lure" of allegorical interpretation as appropriate to reading F. Q. in general. 
If "the text invites us, lures us, to these activities [i.e., interpretation and the de-
sire for hermeneutic closure] and then obliterates the possibility of interpreta-
tion" (ibid), one may well wonder what these lures are doing there in the first 
place. Why, in other words, should F. Q. present itself so temptingly to cen-
turies of readers as something inviting and rewarding hermeneutic closure, if the 
nature of this closure were not something at issue in the poem? 
Part of an answer to this question is that Spenser traps the reader into believ-
I ing that there is no problem of interpretation at all. Goldberg, I suggest, misses 
the all-pervading interplay in F. Q. between readerly and writerly, between 
temptation to allegorical recuperation and its denial, betv.reen the projection of 
narrative teleology and its frustration. Certainly some of this is present in Gold-
berg's discussion, but he has not earned the right to assert it to the exact degree 
that he has not explored the equivocation-possibly fecund, possibly sterile, de-
pending on one's analytical acumen-implicit in his model of the text and the 
model of reader response corresponding to it. F. Q. is not just difficult instead 
of being easy. Rather, its difficulty lies precisely in its apparent ease, an Case 
that masks and discloses the kinds of difficulties Goldberg discusses, and which 
demand the kind of reader that Goldberg, borrowing from Stanley Fish, never 
succeeds in rationalizing: a reader at once guileless and cunning, to read a text 
at once readerly and writerly. 
Part of Goldberg's problem in attempting to short-circuit allegorical reading 
! is that his notion of allegory seems to be no more sophisticated than that of the 
contributors to the Spenser Variorum. That is, both seem to agree that allegor-
izing F. Q. means turning it into a ,'011lCln a clef, a set of allusions to other texts, 
which allusions when run to ground would give us the poem's "meaning." Had 
he pursued Variorum-style allegorizing with the same intense insight he pur-
sues its rejection, Goldberg might have found that the remarkable thing about 
the Variorum is that it represents such unerringly right responses to F. Q. as a 
readerly text, that is, F. Q. as a set of allegorical traps, of allegorical lures hold-
ing out to the reader the hope of recuperation. And in the interminable quarrels 
about "right" meanings that are printed in its appendices, the Variorum unwit-
tingly produces our first deconstructive analysis of F. Q., an analysis in which 
frustration of the desire for meaning and closure is paramount. As it is, Endlesse 
Worke in rejecting allegorical -moralizing. in refusing "to homilize the text, to 
J __ 
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find it voicing the commonplaces of Renaissance culture," only succeeds in doing 
the same thing itself: homilizing the text, this time by drawing on the common-
place of deconstruction, and turning it into a sermon on the evils of desire. As 
I suggested above, to rationalize the frustrations of the text is no longer to be 
frustrated. 
It is finally questionable that Goldberg serves his thesis well by taking Book 
Four as paradigmatic for the whole of F. Q. Considering his blindness to the full 
range of significance wluch Spenser gives to interpretoa.tion, allegorical and other-
wise, in the opening book, it is not surprising that Goldberg should miss the most 
important paradigm of deferred closure that Spenser offers us: the postponement 
of the eschatological closure of world history otherwise "predicted" continually 
in, Book One's references to the Book of Revelations, but finally denied Red-
crosse and only anagogically foreshadowed in his victory over the dragon. In 
other words, Book One gives us the central biblical paradigm of allegorical inter-
pretation itself-the projection of historical types into the eschatological antitypes 
of history's end-as the model of ~ll other deferrals. Featuring as he does the 
synt8.gmatic, metonymical, and narrative dimension at the expense of the para-
digmatic, metaphorical, and -allegorical dimension, Goldberg misses the central 
conflict Spenser sets up between these from the very beginning: we see the pu-
tative "allegorical meanings" of Redcrosse's successive battles repeatedly under-
cut by unfolding events. Far from being that which the reader must eschew if 
he is to engage the poem's denials of closure, the temptations of allegorical 
closure-the temptation ultimately to idolatrous reduction of meaning to a single 
text, the temptation of the Christian and the Spenserian alike-lie at the heart of 
the de constructive enterprise that Spenser conceals within his text. 
MICHAEL MCCANLES 
Alarquette University 
Romantics, Rebels and Reactiona1ies, English Literature and its Backg;round 1760-
1830 by Marilyn Butler. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1982. Pp. 213. $17.95. 
Those familiar with Marilyn Butler's other books on Edgeworth (1972), 
Austen (1975), and Peacock (1979) will find her new work equally exciting and 
innovative, as she has now become one of the most distinguished historical critics 
of the Romantic period. Those, however, expecting a literary history which 
synthesizes consensual views, with absolute demarcations between the non-
literary "background" and the foregrounded literature, will be startled because 
this is a ground-breaking study. Although the word" background " is in Butler's 
title, it is a little misleading because the metaphor, as it has been employed by 
literary historians, suggests two separate realms which are mostly autonomous and 
which connect at only a few points. Rather, Butler's literary history portrays as 
body of literature from 1760 to 1830 that passes through four distinct periods, 
each of which is socially determined, ideologically charged, intellectually polemi-
cal, and historically specific. The decisive turning-points are not caused by in-
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dividual thinkers (Rousseau, Kant, Burke), poets (Blake, Wordsworth), or critics 
(Coleridge, Hazlitt) because, according to Butler, the social group, not isolated 
individuals, generates a culture r..vithin which individuals can work creatively (see 
pp. 9-10; 15). The book's inscription from Shelley'S A Defense of Poetry indi-
cates her dialectical sense of cultural production: "Poets, not otherwise than 
philosophers, painters, sculptors and musicians, arc, in one sense, the creators, 
and, in another, the creations of their age. From this subjection, the loftiest do 
not escape." 
Periodizing English Romanticism has been an hazardous enterprise, vulnerable 
to numerous inconsistencies and anarnolies, one of which is that the "thorough-
going dogma of the mysterious, subconscious origin of art "-the distinctively 
:&omantic notion of imagination's autonomy from the external world-" has to 
wait for the 1830s, for the work of J. S. Mill, Thomas Carlyle and John Keble. 
The doctrine is complete and widely accepted only for the generation after 
'the English Romantics'" (p. 8). Posthumous theories of English Romanticism 
have revealed as much about the -aesthetic predilections of the theorists as the 
literature they were theorizing. Using an historical rigor infrequently found 
among scholars of Romantic writing, so many of whom have derived their own 
aesthetic values from portions of Romanticism, Butler reconstructs a literary 
evolution from the perpective of the culture that produced and consumed the 
literature. Although she qualifies her periodization with some skepticism over 
the precise dates, the four periods are nevertheless distinct and coherent, even if 
they sometimes overlap. 
The first period, from 1760 to 1790, Butler identifies in the first chapter with 
an Enlightenment culture marked by ml innovative, liberal Neoclassicism, which 
is in part a reaction against the narrower Augustan Neolassicism, with its sense 
of hierarchy, luxury, and rococo detail. Enlightenment Neoclassicism" initiates 
the rejection of previous values, the intellectual and artistic aggression, that for 
one and a half centuries has been attributed to Romanticism" (p. 6). Influenced 
by some recent art historians of Neoclassicism, Butler revalues the English En-
lightenment in a refreshing way, especially because Romantic studies have so 
frequently accepted Coleridge's and Carlyle's view of eighteenth-century culture 
as inhumanly rational and abstract, perversely individualistic, and aesthetically 
impoverished. The aristocracy, which dominates politics and rules the society 
during the entire 1760-1830 period, decisively shapes Neoclassicism, according to 
Butler. Directly in Parliament and more indirectly as "culture's paymaster" (p. 
179), the confident landowners resisted any encroachments 'Upon their power by 
the monarchy in a libertarian rhetoric whose democratic implications far ex-
ceeded their aristocratic intentions, expanded their wealth with the agricultural 
revolution and new investments in trade and industry, and cleared away politi-
cal, economic, and ideological barriers that might restrain the aggressive pursuit 
of their self-interest (pp. 11-16). Coexisting with tIus aristocratic insurgence are 
social changes-rising population, the marketing of the arts, urbanization, class 
consciousness-that ultimately run counter to the gentry's interests, but at least 
in this period, the ideology of Neoclassicism seems universal, to speak for human-
ity. The sentimental and Gothic novels reflect the Enlightenment movement to-
ward essentialism, representing the primary emotions and "man's" true nature; 
all of this is discernible as well in social criticism and poetry that looked back 
~----------------------------------------------------~. 
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to more primitive societies for durable values. Empiricism in science and philos-
ophy, and the cult of sensibility in novels and poetry. both preoccupied with 
studying how the mind worked, engendered a particular individualism that as-
sumed a common human nature capable of engaging the world without the need 
for authoritarian social codes. Moreover, the Enlightenment's subjectivism and 
emphasis on feeling were eminently social, designed to criticize the corrupt 
status quo and move society toward a more "natural" state. Reformist senti-
ment, strongest among the disenfranchised Dissenters, was widespread, explicit in 
novels and poems expressing sympathy for a host of social victims, from War 
veterans to prisoners. However optimistic the culture was in many of its modes, 
it also possessed a "darker" current, which gave a voice to the anxiety caused 
by rapid social change. The "nightmare" of the Gothic, and the historical 
perspective of Adam Smith and Edward Gibbon, who portrayed social forces as 
far more powerful than individuals, are congruent with the period's brooding 
obsession with death and mutability; these, however, are different, more pessi-
mistic responses to the same social phenomena that are dealt with optimistically 
elsewhere. 
In the second chapter she analyzes the cultural effects of the French Revolu-
tion, which alienated the English aristocracy from Neoclassicism and generated 
the conditions for a new cultural period. From about 1790 to about 1818, the 
dominant cultural tendency was consciously conservative and explicitly anti-
revolutionary. Many of the features traditionally associated with romanticism 
emerge as reactionary counters to Enlightenment Neoclassicism. The cult of 
sensibility becomes ideologically suspect, since the priorities of feeling and in-
dividual response suggest an individualism at odds with the new priorities of 
hierarchy, hearth and home, and deference to social custom. Neoclassical essen- 1 
tialism, which evoked a universal human nature and an international focus, gives 1:1 
way to a xenophobic particularism, a nationalist sense of England's specialness and I.! 
superiority, an organic notion of the society'S irrational but nevertheless legitimate 
uniqueness. By the late 1790s, the Gothic falls out of fashion since its concen-
tration on the individual's response to extreme situations is too morally relative 
during the anti-French panic when traditional institutions need defending. Gill-
ray's popular.ity in the later 1790s reflects not simply the aristocracy's wishes but 
a general revulsion against Enlightenment culture, now identified with revolu-
tionary France. Buder depicts the revolutionary decade as. creatively contra-
dictory, with an unequal war of ideas between radicals and reactionaries. Her 
portrait of Blake, for example, is of a Neoclassical artist inspired by the Dissent 
tradition of reformism, the revolutionary hopes of the early 1790s, and the artisan 
radicalism of London. Though unaffected by Enlightenment rationalism, Blake 
nevertheless shared Neoclassicism's view of the human figure's centrality (rep-
resented in his famous design, "Glad Day" [po 41]), its international concept of 
politics (his prophetic poems on the French Revolution, America, Europe, and 
Asia), its individualism and its sexual libertariansm. Although Blake's myth-
making owes much to the native tradition of Bible-reading, it also reflects En-
lightenment mythography, Neoclassical essentialism and abstractness. He turned 
away from revolution when dle English reaction had destroyed the radical move-
ment, which forked into an atheist rationalism he could not support and a re-
treating Dissent, which never again was at the forefront of reformist agitation. 
l 
J 
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Like his artisan friend Sharp. Blake sought consolation in millenarian religion 
that promised what politics could no longer deliver (pp. 49-50). Although his 
post-1797 writings express defiant protest, it is depoliticized, with the new em-
phasis on mystical perception, a merciful Christ, and private system-building. 
Similarly, Wordsworth went through a revolutionary phase, Neoclassical in al-
most every feature, then gradually abandoned Enlightenment ideas once he re-
jected revDlution. Burkean notions of family, organic society, the evils of in-
tellectualism, the sacredness of English ground, and the superiority of rural pa-
ternalism coexisted ,vith strikingly Neoclassical remnants in a work like Lyrical 
Ballads, and even TlJe Excursion, both of which were condemned by influential 
critics for ideological reasons. Written by the no longer revolutionary Words-
worth, who was adopting conservative ideas, the Lyrical Ballads is ironically the 
most rigorous expression of Neoclassical poetics. "Wordsworth's experiments 
with subjects from among the lower orders of society, in metres appropriately 
taken from popular poerty, follow thirty years of public interest in this matter 
and manner, and are thus characteristic of the culture of the Enlightenment" 
(p. 58). His originality rests with "the thoroughgoingness and consistency with 
which he tries to apply Neoclassical precepts, and above all in his concentration 
on \vhat for him are the ultimate principles, simplicity of language and truth to 
personal expercnce" (p. 60). There is nothing in the Lyrical Ballads "that could 
not have been written in 1788" (p.61). 
The diverse careers of Gillray, Blake, and Wordsworth illustrate a charac-
teristic of Butler's literary history: although ideological pressures and social de-
terminants never cease to exert their power, they do so differently in different 
writers, unevenly, unpredictably, and in contradictory ways. While the earlier 
Borde1'ers by vVordsworth is a typical counter-revolutionary play, illustrating 
the venality of the revolutionary intellectual, the later Lyrical Ballads is an 
ideological offense to conservative opinion, not so much for aesthetic reasons 
(Jeffrey actually liked the poetry), but for po1itical reasons, since the social order 
had to be defended from democratic tendencies while the war against revolution-
ary France was not yet won. 
I do not have the space to discuss the boole's treatment of other authors and 
periods. Even my reproducing, in a condensed form, the first two chapters suf-
fers from oversimplification. Indeed, the great virtue of Butler's history, no mat-
ter how prominent the social determinants, is the subtle discriminations and 
qualifications she employs to make each period, writer and text distinctive. I will 
give a brief sketch of the other chapters. The chapter on Coleridge depicts a 
talented writer subject to new social pressures that affected literary production 
and made possible a new notion of the literary intellectual. The chapter on Scott 
and Austen, novelists of the gentry, restores the intellectual" war of ideas" and 
ideological pointedness of their writing, but does so in a way that defines their 
uniqueness and accounts for their development. The two chapters on the Neo-
classical re-vival and the intellectual war between conservative Romantics and 
liberal Neoclassicals derive from her Peacock book but include a lot of new ma-
terial, The Neoclassical revival, from 1812 to 1822, initiated by Byron, Shelley, 
Keats, Hunt, Peacock and Hazlitt, is unified by a polemical and ideological 
counter-attack against a reactionary romanticism practiced by the older Words-
worth and Southey, but especially by the most coherent spokesman for Chris-
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tian conservatism and Germanic Romanticism, Coleridge. The revival, differing 
in many ways from what it revived, is marked by considerable diversity among its 
exponents, unevenness of ideological coherence in each writer, and important 
shifts in emphasis at various moments. Despite the revival's politics, it did not 
produce merely partisan propaganda, as Butler illustrates the writers' sensitivity 
to the disturbing effects of historical change. The chapter on the Romantic 
novel and prose distinguishes English Romanticism from its German counterpart 
and discusses the final period, the IS20s, which is characterized by the religious 
revival, increasing privatism, retreat from political concerns after the successful -[ 
post-Pcterloo repression, and new notions of the writer as a special kind of 
producer and personality. In the concluding chapter she settles accounts with I 
som,e major romanticists (Wellek, Bloom) and criticizes some dominant notions 
of English Romanticism that her study challenges. 
Although Butler is not the first to write historical criticism of the Romantic 
writers, no one has composed a literary history of the period like this one, which 
weaves together such a diversity of authors and genres, which so thoroughly 
restores the broad political intentions of such an extensive body of literature. 
One leaves her history not with a smug sense that each text can now be pigeon-
holed into a social category, but with a new sense of wonder, since the litera-
ture is now mediated primarily not by our own contemporary notions of what 
constitutes H Romanticism" but by the remarkable culture created by men and 
women who lived in a different era, with their own urgent concerns. Butler 
shifts the center of interpretive gravity from a dominant subjectivism, which has 
derived authority from portions of Romanicism, to an historicism, which 
acknowledges the specific, unrepeatable nature of that particular, ever-changing 
culture. A history \vhich opens up the literature and makes it seem new is quite 
remarkable. Moreover, Butler has illustrated by example that an historicist 
methodology need not be reductive or moralistic (she likes the reactionaries as 
well as the rebels and those in between), and that one can employ Marxian COllR 
cepts of ideology and social determination without so privileging structural de-
terminants that social consciousness is a mere reflection and social intentions 
epiphenomenal. She also writes elegant English prose, not arcane jargon. Her 
book should spark controversy as well as new readings and interpretations of 
the literature. 
MICHAEL 8cIuvENER 
W Q')'ne State University 
The Tl'ans-parent: Sexual Politics in the Language of Emerson by Eric Cheyfitz. 
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Pp. xv + 
188. $13.50. 
In a memoir simply entitled" Mr. Emerson" Henry James Sr. recalls his exas-
peration in trying to fathom the II awful and adorable" secret of his friend's 
inscrutable genius. "How I used to Jock myself up with him in his bedroom," 
James recounts, "swearing that before the door was opened I would arrive at 
l 
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the secret of his immense superiority to the common herd of literary men." 
Needless to say, that" secret" was not forthcoming, and James, playing the part 
of balked suitor with evident relish, goes on to lament that Emerson was more 
of a tease than a Transcendentalist. As impenetrable as "a vestal virgin" and 
"as plucky as a women," Emerson's "immense superiority came to him . . . 
like a woman's beauty or charm of manners." His genius strikes James as "some-
how divinely begotten" or "virgin born"j indeed "Emerson himself was an 
unsexed woman, a veritable fruit of almighty power in the sphere of our na-
tu,re." Not many today will be likely to subscribe to this freakish opinion, but it 
suggests a way of reading Emerson that Eric Cheyfitz is not only prepared to 
endorse but make central to the argument of his book on Tbe Trans-parent. 
Though he never refers to James's memoir, Cheyfitz has set out to demonstrate 
in more extensive fashion what James's metaphors playfully hint at: Emerson's 
ambivalent sexuality. In a wholly original and re-orienting approach to his sub-
ject, Cheyfitz sees" Emerson as at once a priest and psychologist of the com-
bined power of language and sex, a worshipper of this power who is also bent 
on analyzing the forms that this worship takes and that it gives to its 'ob-
ject'" (xi). To the extent that this premise is a genuinely viable one, Cheyfitz's 
own analysis unlocks for us many doors to Emerson (and not merely of the 
bedroom variety), though in doing so it should be added that Cheyfiitz locks 
some doors of his own. 
Although it ranges throughout Emerson's works, The Trans-parent focuses 
primarily on Nature, which is seen as dramatizing a "scene of sexual conflict" 
or "power play" between masculine and feminine figures of authority. These 
figures, "two hypothetical representatives of Emerson," appear in Nature as 
"the FATHER" and as "my beautiful mother" or the" Me" and the "Not 
Me"; the former' denoting the ideal or divine life of the manly power Emerson 
struggles to attain, while the latter signifies the material, bodily realm of what 
Emerson calls "the actual life" through which " the FATHER" is suggested 
and revealed. Between each figure Cheyfitz posits a "child-hero" whose task, 
Cheyfitz claims, is "to convert the suggestiveness of the mother into the satis-
factions of the father" (4), to make, in other words, the "Not me 1) of the 
mother transparent to the "Me" of the father. Following Emerson, Cheyfitz 
identifies this desired conversion as! a marriage that joins "Matter and Mind," 
the sensual and intellectual, or the motherly and fatherly-H in the ideal form of 
this marriage in Nature, the mother ... becomes transparent, or effaces herself 
to reveal the F ATHER to the child" (70). To consummate this marriage Chey-
fitz's "child-hero" seeks a language which is transparent in the sense that it 
discloses the father or meaning of the text of nature (and Nature) and which is 
trans-parent in the sense that this disclosure appears as "a perfect absorption of 
the mother by the FATHER" (58). But Cheyfitz is more than skeptical about 
the harmony of such a marriage, which is vouchsafed not only by "a perfect 
absorption of the mother" but through, as he shows, a violent excision or ban-
ishing of the feminine that insures the domination of the father. Emerson's mar-
riage, Chcyfitz asserts, "appears to envision a transcendent idealism, and yet this 
idealism only appears to to be a rhetoric of fear, a fear of that foreigner called 
'feminine,' a xenophobia that parodies the masculine patriotism it tries to pro-
ject"(67). 
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This compressed summary, however, does little justice to the ambitious range 
and complexity of the book. Cheyfitz's interests extend beyond a simple case 
study of Emerson's" ambivalent sexuality)) and his style is blessedly uncluttered 
by psychoanalytic jargon. Instead, Cheyfitz stays as close as possible to the in-
nicate contours (and detours) of Emerson's metaphoric drama, though this can 
at times result in a rather bumpy l'ide, particularly in the first two chapters 
where Cheyfitz, ill the manner of Emerson, jumps from topic to topic without 
providing a coherent overview. Much of this is a necessary hazard, for Cheyfitz 
is intent on demonstrating how the conflict between the masculine and the 
feminine corresponds to larger political tensions between Emerson's conception 
of democracy and aristocracy, the mob and the hero, or the" fearful extent and 
multitude of objects" in nature and the unequivocal, transparent language of the 
FATHER. Many have noticed Emerson's uncomfortable relation to "the reign 
of King Mob" in the era of Jacksonian Democracy, but Cheyfitz's novel perspec-
tive yields a number of refreshing insights. His reflections on "the uncommonly 
common" or "extraordinarily ordinary hero" of an essay like" Heroism" stand 
as the most provocative account we have on this difficult issue since Perry Mil-
ler's pioneering study of "Emersonian Genius and American Democracy." If 
Emerson's writings outwardly raise a revolutionary call for the democritization 
of genius-a vision of greatness in which all can share-they also betray "a 
nostalgic yearning" for "aristocratic repose." The hero simultaneously repre-
sents the commonwealth of genius (what Cheyfitz archly calls "the United 
States of the Self") and is in flight from the anarchic, chaotic impulses which 
threaten to degrade that commonwealth into a despotic mob. Noting Emerson's 
propensity to associate the volatile, capricious, and instable with the feminine, 
Cheyfitz places in opposition to this" motherly mob" the figure of the eloquent 
orator, \vho epitomizes manliness for Emerson. The duty of the orator, accord- I ! 
ing to Cheyfitz, is to domesticate the mob (and the fearful willfullness of femi-
ninity it projects) by ordering its passions and directing its will. And "just as 
Emerson's orator must charm the mob in order to reveal its identjty with' The 
Over-soul,' so the child-hero of Nat'w'e must charm 'the fearful extent and 
multitude of objects,' the veiling language of nature, or mother, in order to un-
veil, or reveaJ, the identity of the father behind it" (121). But his enterprise is 
at best precarious; seeking to charm the mother, the child-hero "risks seduction 
at the hands of the seduced," risks, in other words, being usurped by the 
"motherly mob" he purports to command. Cheyfitz usefully relates this re-
versal to a more generalized anxiety on the part of male writers like Emerson, 
Tocqueville, 2nd Hawthorne that American literature was becoIJ1ing alarmingly 
feminized by, in Hawthorne's memorable phrase, a "damned mob of scribbling 
women." Drawing upon and extending insights by Ann Douglas and others, 
Cheyfitz is particularly good in showing us how these writers alternately view 
women as guardians of domestic harmony and potential harbingers of its dis-
solution. The fourth chapter, which is entitled "The Decline of the Father," 
perhaps the strongest section of the book, offers an exciting reading of the 
blurring of sexual identities (as well as the" democratic language" that struggles 
to articulate them) in a way that wholly revitalizes that tired shibboleth, "sexual 
politics." 
As the sequence of its chapters suggesE, The Trans-parent tells a story; one 
J 
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which begins with II The Hero of Metaphor," proceeds to II The Marriage of 
Eloquent and Stammering Eyes" (Chapter 3), chronicles "The Decline of the 
Father," and ends with "The Heroin,e of Metaphor." And yet, if Cheyfitz is 
illuminating and on occasion brilliant in teasing out the political ramficatons of 
Emerson's domestic drama, he can be less rewarding when dealing with its spe-
cifically sexual conflicts. The drama of The T1"anS-parent, for example, comes 
to a climax of sorts at the end of the third chapter, where we are presented with 
a reading of Nature's "primal scene." The "scene" or ,I spectacle" unfolds as 
the child "watch[es] the intercourse of the mother and FATHER; as the mother 
dies, 'fades and shrivels up,' the child appears privileged to have intercourse with 
the FATHER; for the object of the spectacle, from the perspective of the hexo 
of metaphor, is the marriage, or union, of the FATHER and child" (110). Pre-
cisely how or where the child witnesses this coupling and so " appears privileged" 
to urnte with the FATHER Cheyfitz does not specify. Readers will no doubt be 
futther surprised to learn ·that Emerson's resolution "not to fling stones at my 
beautiful mother, nor soil my gentle nest" represents" a moment of excitement" 
in which the child-hero II has forgotten the discipline of toilet training" (112). 
From this it somehow follows that "at the moment of the revelation of the 
child's manly identity, the mother appears as the faeces of this male form. She is 
excreted, cast out of a purified body that seems no longer to need her nourish-
ment, having digested her completely and put her to good use" (! 13). Aside 
from the fact that Cheyfitz reconstructs this "spectacle" by gathering stray 
phrases which can appear as much as twenty pages apart in Nature, the problem 
with this reading is that it abruptly forecloses the "shifting imbalance of power" 
or tensed ambivalence between the masculine and feminine that Cheyfitz is else-
where so dextrous at highlighting. If this "primal scene" represents the "cast-
ing-out" or "death of the mother," why does she continue to pose such a 
menace to Emerson, a menace that Cheyfitz goes on to develop at length in his 
final chapter? What sh·:mld be the centerpiece of the book is pushed to an un-
necessary and tendentit.:us extreme. Seizing upon random epithets out of con-
text like "utter impotence," "erect organ," or II barren pipes" does not really 
substantiate his argument but only trivializes it. 
Which is unfortunate, since readers wary of Cheyfitz's methods will only be 
further alienated by this momentary lapse at the expense of overlooking the 
book's solid merits. This is of course a risk any adventurous thesis must run, 
but then Cheyfitz expends little effort in attempting to anticipate objections or an-
swer counter arguments with regard to the larger assumptions of his analysis. For 
all the scrupulous and painstaking discriminations accorded a particular passage, 
one must also wonder about the final image of Emerson that emerges. More than 
once Cheyfitz suggests in his final chapter that Emerson's ideal of the manly, 
commanding orator may be nothing more than a "dream" or defensive "com-
pensation" designed to mask what Emerson perceived to be his own negligible 
impact on his times. And yet, while we may agree Wtll Cheyfitz's observation 
that" at no point in his life can Emerson be said to have commanded the mob" 
to the extent he envisions for his eloquent orator, it seems a rather self-serving 
argument to conclude that Emerson's professional identity as lecturer "pre-
cluded the manly command with which he seems so fascinated in his 
works" (101). If Emerson never fully realized his dream of writing an eloquent-
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ly "popular" boole which would be a "Sceptre of irresistible command," it was 
nonetheless a dream that continued to compel some of his best and most memor-
able writing for the better part of thirty years. 
Readers will find many .other points of disagreement with Cheyfitz's under-
standing of Emerson's "sexual politics." But, even for the most skeptical audi-
ence, his book should be welcomed for treating Emerson with the complexity 
and sensitivity his works so badly need and have so rarely received. The read-
ings of Tocquevillc which accompany the analysis of Emerson are, incidentally 
some of the finest on this author, whose Democracy in America has too often 
been reduced by literary critics to a handbook of vapid generalizations. What-
ever the local pitfalls of its argument or the reductive temptations which it in-
vit~s, The Trans-pare,nt represents a substantial advance in our understanding of 
Nature which future students of Emerson will not want to ignore. 
KERRY CHAru.ES LARSON 
University of Michigan 
Joyce's Cities: A1'cbaeologies of the Soul by Jackson I. Cope. Baltimore and Lon-
don: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Pp. xii + 144. $12.95. 
In his Preface to Joyce's Cities: Archaeologies of the Soul, Jackson Cope de-
scribes his book as "an imaginary coursing of stages in James Joyce's imagina-
tion." Attempting to place Joyce's work in its historical context, he maps out the 
intellectual milieu of the turn of the century and charts connections between 
Joyce and some of the dominant intellectual currents and historical discoveries of 
his time. It is the period's fascination with mysticism, however, which most in-
terests Cope and leads him to interpret joyce's \"orks in light of such figures as 
the Italian poet and playwright D' Annunzio and such works as the Kabbalah and 
the Egyptian Book of the Dead. 
Cope's admittedly speculative method allows him to write sentences such as 
the following: "A first coincidence at this time might have shaken Joyce the 
mystic, had either he or its author-subject [Marinetti] been aware of it" (p. 
106); "If he [Joyce] had also read the Maia poems, he would have found yet 
another view of the modern waste land ... " (p. 30) j «It was just here ... that 
D' Annunzio would have found a fact that he could translate into a mythic irony 
that Joyce peTbaps echoed and clearly bettered in ' A Little Cloud'" (p. 34) 
[Italics arc mine]. One of the primary defects of this book, which, to my mind, 
ultimately overshadows the wealth of fascinating material it offers, is its lack of 
convincing evidence to support the connections drawn between Joyce's work 
and other texts. The "imaginary coursing" begins to resemble the documenta-
tion of possible or even non-events and connections in the "Ithaca" chapter of 
Ulysses, where the catechism shifts from indicative to subjunctive: "For what 
personal purpose could Bloom have applied the water so boiled?" "If he had 
smiled why would he have smiled?" In his discussion of Joyce's mysticism, Cope 
requires of his reader an overwhelming belief in the unseen. 
In order to be specific about the leaps of faith I think are demanded by Cope's 
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critical method, I want to focus on the fourth chapter of the book, tC Ulysses: 
Joyce's Kabbalah." But before proceeding, it might be useful to sketch out the 
significance of the titular term "archaeologies" and its relevance to the explora-
tion of J ayce's work. First, the word refers literally to the historic excavations 
of Troy, Mycenae, Crete, and Tutankhamen's tomb. Tracing the impact of 
these discoveries on the imagination of Joyce's contemporaries, Cope shows how 
they {)iIered the twentieth-century artist a wonderfully rich source of myth. He 
argues, for example, that Evans's Cretan excavations affected D'Annunzio's treat-
ment of myth, which, in turn, affected Joyce's. But as well as referring to ac-
tual excavations of the time, the term "archaeologies" refers metaphorically to 
the process of uncovering the complex layering of history, myth, and image 
that mal{es up the cultural psyche of an age. Cope attempts to "unearth" or 
uncover the various layers of the turn-of-the-century psyche. (As a mapping 
of certain dominant structures which inform a culture, this archaeological in-
vestigation loosely resembles and is probably meant to evoke Foucault's Archae-
ology of Knowledge.) 
So, for example, Cope advances the notion that the turn of the century was 
more "mystical than mythical" and proceeds to map out the field of myth and 
mysticism in D' Annunzio, Yeats, the theosophists, the Kabbalah, and the Egyp-
tain Book of the Dead. He argues that D' Annunzio's "largely forgotten play" 
La citta morta influenced joyce's treatments of "A Little Cloud" and Exiles, 
and served as the catalyst for Joyce's reworking of Stephen Hero into A Portrait 
Of the Artist as a Young Man. Cope also claims that contemporary interest in 
the Kabbalah influenced Joyce's narrative technique and symbolism in Ulysses 
and that the Egyptain Book of the Dead, as well as the historic discovery of 
Tutankhamen's tomb, led Joyce to create his own Book of the Dead in Finne-
gans Wake. 
In presenting the general cultural matrix of the time, Cope is often quite pro-
vocative-his treatments of the necropolis as recurrent image in early modern 
literature, for example, and the particular combination of creativity and fraud 
that allowed turn of the century intellectuals to "invent" their own cultural 
inheritance are particularly fine. In fact, the decision to fl"eely map a cultural 
field rather than slavishly trace a narrow line of historical influence in the old 
sense is commendable. One applauds the potential liberation from constricting 
positivist assumptions about "influence U that an "imaginary coursing" might 
offer-for example, the freedom to trust in one's inruitive sense of the con-
gruences between two texts or artistic sensibilities without the necessity of ap-
pealing to an author's explicit statements about influence. 
But Cope is not content to map congruences or common structures. Instead, 
he draws very specific causal connections between texts and insists on claiming 
significant interpretive consequences for the discovery of these links. He at-
tempts, in fact, not only to show that these texts influenced Joyce's aesthetic, but 
that they were models for some major elements of Joyce's work. Because Cope 
establishes such high expectations, we need to be convinced that Joyce was at 
least familiar with the works that supposedly influenced him and that they and 
not some other equally plausible texts provided the model or source. Since Cope 
makes such large claims for specific textual connections, the reader does require 
some biographical evidence of joyce's exposure to these texts (How do we know, 
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for example, that Joyce had more than a passing knowledge of the Kabbalah?). 
And, finally, a study of this sort must rest on both the appropriateness and use-
fulness of its inruitions-do the connections seem right to us and do they illumi-
nate the text? 
At its best, this book does draw some convincing connections, for example, the 
relationship ben.veen D'Annunzio and A Portrait, and the relationship between 
the Egyptian Book of the Dead and Finnegans Wake. But methodological weak-
nesses underlie much of the study and are most apparent in the chapter HUlysses: 
Joyce's Kabbalah," to which I now would li1<e to turn. After presenting useful 
information about the importance of such late Yictorian and tum of the century 
translations and interpretations of the Kabbalah as Mathers' The Kabbalah Un-
veiled and Waite's The Doctrine o:nd Literature of the Kabbalah and The Secret 
Doctrine in Israel, Cope proceeds by a series of assumptions to claim that Joyce's 
method and narrative style, as well as certain specific symbols, are rooted in the 
Kabbalah. But nowhere are we ever actually shown why he believes that Joyce 
had extensive knowledge of the Kabbalah. (In an earlier article on this theme, 
Cope ,disagrees with J. S. Atherton's assertion that Joyce knew the Kabbalah only 
through the eleventh edition of the Encyclopedia Brittanica, but does not ex-
plain the grounds of disagreement, and in the present study not even this refer-
ence is given.) Because this is never firmly established in Cope's argument, his 
use of specific passages or teachings of the Kabbalah to elucidate themes and 
gloss passages in Ulysses seems quite presumptuous. In the interest of brevity I 
cite only one example: Cope's explanation of Rudy'S death and the subsequent 
"sinful barrenness" of the Blooms. Appealing to the teachings of the Zohar 
(the Kabbalistic Bible), Cope argues that Bloom and Molly have defied Kab-
balistic law by having intercourse during the day and, even worse, by engaging 
in sex which was precipitated by Molly's view of two dogs copulating. Cope 
links this sacrilegious incident to the blasphemous inversion of God and dog 
found elsewhere in Ulysses and says, "The inversion by Molly and Bloom be-
comes a link in this tradition, if one pursues the kabbalistic teachings on the 
mystery of sex" (p. 84). These strained connections lead us to question why 
we should pursue kabbalistic teachings, that is, why we should believe they are 
relevant to the judgment of Molly and Leopold Bloom. 
However, not only does Cope claim that the Kabbalah influenced, Joyce, but 
also that it indeed provided the impetus for the creation of a "new fictional 
form n in Ulysses: he says that" Joyce was so drawn into the world of kabba-
lism as a structure that could be transmuted into a new fictional fonn ... that 
he followed the curve of the kabbalistic psyche" (p. 81). This assertion too 
seems unconvincing on a number of counts, for Cope fails to show why the 
Kabbalah, rather than other possible models, is particularly appropriate. For ex-
ample, his statement that both the Zohar and Ulysses are "systems at once ab-
stract and concrete" (p. 80) may be true, but this dual aspect of Ulysses can be 
accounted for in other ways as well. In an article entitled" Homer's Sticks and 
Stones" (The lames loyce QU(fI"terly, 6 [19691, 285-98), Hugh Kenner argues 
that the model of the Homeric myth itself provided both abstract analogy and 
concrete particulars for Joyce. Kenner maintains that the archaeological excava-
tion of Troy imparted a sense of physical reality to Homer's story, which at-
tracted Joyce when he came to write Ulysses. 
I 
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Similarly, the argument that magic and mystical literature provide the sources 
for joyce's narrative techniques seem to me to be equally questionable. It is 
Cope's idea that the kind of cosmic comciousness that is part of Yeatsian "doc-
trine" and mysticism in general provides the background for Joyce's" narratoI-
less narrative." One may believe, however, along with others like Michael Groden 
in Ulysses in Progress, that the background for this technical choice is more 
aesthetic than spiritual, that Joyce became skeptical of the possibility of a nar-
rator, in part at least in response to the limitation of certain kinds of narrative 
strategies. Perhaps, also, the breakdown of the psychological boundaries of in-
dividual characters so that they share images and thoughts, another aspect of the 
cosmic consciousness cited by Cope, has linguistic and cultural roots. Continuing 
in the tradition of Flaubert, Joyce demonstrates that thought and langu?ge run 
in grooves, that we all inherit idees ref us. 
And, finally, Cope's general comparison between the highly schematized cor-
respondences in Ulysses and the Kabbalah may hold true, but he fails to ac1mowl-
edge Joyce's often skeptical attitude toward and treatment of mysticism, cor-
respondence, and system. Cope dismisses too lightly Stephen's disparaging at-
titude toward theosophy in "Scylla and Charybdis," and the parody of cor-
respondence, relationship, and exhaustive system in the n Ithaca" chapter of the 
book. 
The application of scriptural models to literary hermeneutics seems to me to 
be an admirable enterprise, one which Frank Kermode in The Genesis of Secrecy 
and Harold Bloom in Kabbalah and Criticism have attempted with interesting 
results. But to argue as Cope does that the Kabbalah provides a specific model 
for Joyce in Ulysses seems both unconvincing and, finally, unilluminating. The 
literary payoff of such an investigation does not live up to its advanced billing. 
Our understanding of style and narrative technique does not seem to be much 
increased by this comparison. 
At the end of Joyce's Cities, Cope refers to a "sympathetic encounter with 
Joyce's mind experienced through his written corpus," a phrase that I think is 
meant to describe the critical enterprise of this book. Indeed, Jackson Cope does 
offer a sympathetic and often highly intriguing encounter with Joyce. But in 
drawing such unsubstantiated connections and claiming for them such import-
ance, he seems almost to ask us to accept his powers of telepathy as well as 
sympathy. Joyce's Cities could have been a breakthrough in the methodology of 
influence studies, but, instead, it turns out to be an often fascinating jaunt through 
myth and mysticism that fails to lead to a true archaeological find. 
KAREN LAWRENCE 
University of Utah 
Agon: Towards a Theory of Revisionism by Harold Bloom. New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 336. $19.95. 
Agon and its companion volume The Breaking of the Vessels (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1982) complete Harold Bloom's more than decade-
long brooding on the sorrows of revisionism that began with Yeats (19iO) and 
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Tbe Anxiety of lnfiuence (1973), reached a peak of theoretical elaboration with 
A Map of Misreading (1975), Kabbala" and Criticism (1975) and Poetry and 
Repression (1976), and bore practical interpretive fruit in his massive study of 
Wallace Stevens, The Poems of Our Climate (1977). But these new volumes are 
more than just refinements of the" system," for they are also acts of self-revi-
sion that look forward to what promises to be a definite literary analysis of 
Freud, Tmnsference and Authority. In this respect, Agon is of particular interest, 
as two of its longer and better chapters treat the work of Bloom's master in 
self-revision. And even though nearly every chapter here has appeared previ-
ously as a separate essay in the five years since the Stevens book, Agon nonethe-
less makes a unified impression, one not solely dependent on the obtrusive strength 
of the critic's personality. 
The reason for the extraordinary coherence of these apparently very different 
pieces lies in Bloom's obsessively pursued topic: the revisionary will of the post-
enlightenment writer, whether poet or critic. Bloom repeatedly traces the man-
ner in which this will to revision appears in the major texts of our modern 
literary culture. Bloom is fascinated by the many ways an author, brought to the 
brink of blank desertion by the sudden memory of a precursor's long-repressed 
words, can rise to the occasion and seize the opportunity such a radically dis-
junctive moment makes in a text. Into the semantic and rhetorical "gulf" of 
such a disjunction, the strong creator projects a sublime representation of him-
self as' an inspiring heroic master of influence, a new image of the prophetic 
voice to be reckoned with. Of course, this sublime self-image is necessarily a 
measure of the differences between oneself and all those distorted or "misread" 
recollections of literary ancestors that constitute the touchstones of the creative 
mind. 
For Bloom, a Jewish devotee of the Gnostic alien god, that primal forefather ! 
who is also an aU-devouring abyss (or foremother), the revisionary moment is 
a repetition of the original creation-fall that plunged the Gnostic pneuma or 
divine spark into the prison of time, historical cycles, and the decaying human 
body. Yet this repetition, as an inventive lie against its own belated status, also 
defines the aim of the writer's quest for sublimity, which is to identify oneself 
with and then to transfer authority to oneself from all those fabulous images 
of his precursors-from Yeats and Blake, say, back to Jehovah and the Demiurge-
with which the would-be creator has lovingly terrorized himself. The critic's 
task, therefore, is to ask over and over again what Bloom wickedly terms "the 
triple question: more? less? equal?" (193). That is, the critic must interrogate 
and measure the competing sublimities of precursor and ephebe. in an attempt to 
settle the issue of who really deserves canonical status among the other grand 
cultural monuments. Given such a prodigiously tendentious vision and such a 
delightfully malicious (if reductive) critical approach, it is no wonder that Agon, 
for all its apparent heterogenity, produces a singular effect in the reader's mind. 
The essays in Agon range from a theoretical discussion of how one makes 
oneself an influence (" Agon: Revisionism and Critical Personality") and a close 
reading of an ancient Gnostic text (" Lying Against Time: Gnosis, Poetry, Criti-
cism ") to energetic encounters with Freud ("Freud and the Sublime" and 
"Freud's Concepts of Defense and the Poetic Will") and a series of essays on 
nineteenth and twentieth cent1lry American literary figures, the most important 
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of which are the discussions of Emerson (" Emerson: The American Religion ") 
and of Whitman ("Whitman's Image of Voice: To the Tally of My Soul"). 
These fifteen essays, considered in groups of five, serve to illustrate the three 
antithetical models of poetic invention that Bloom now proposes. He analogizes 
poetic invention with a catastrophe theory of creation derived from Gnosticism, 
with a psychoanalytic perspective on the family romance, and with a rhetorical, 
transumptive procedure of reversing images of earliness and belatedness found in 
critical and poetic texts alike. In addition, Agol1 stands as a marker of what 
Bloom calls "the American difference," a difference that evades by its willful 
extravangance both traditional, Arnoldian forms of humanism and all recent de-
constructive forms of antihumanism imported from the continent. That is, Bloom 
asserts that only a truly strong, totally antithetical kind of stance can serve the 
American critic as he faces an American canon of great writers in this time of 
America's obvious decline. 
The most significant feature of these essays is their revision of Bloom's dialectic 
of revisionism first formulated in A lvlap of .i\1isreading and most fully worked 
out in Poetry and Repression. In these works, Bloom argues that the pattern of 
revisionary interpretation discernible in all post-enlightenment texts worth the 
effort of reading could be reduced to an endlessly recurring cycle of three 
phases or acts: an initial moment of limitation or ironic self-reduction; a second 
moment of substitution in which the writer develops his sense of identity by re-
inventing the beloved masks of his precursors; and a fin:ll moment in which the 
writer produces a sublime representation of himself as the only begetter of his 
fathers and so of himself as well. (The ultimate source of this pattern, as Bloom 
contends in Kabbalah and Criticism, is Issac Luria's revision of the Kabbalah). 
In Agon this dialectic of limitation, substitution, and representation (or restitu-
tion) becomes the antithetical triad of negation (or cancellation), evasion (or 
self-preservation), and extravagance (or exaltation) (see" Lying Against Time," 
pp. 59-60). The significance of this self-revision is really t\Vofold; the triad of 
negation, evasion, and extravagance is more in line with Bloom's three models 
of poetic invention discussed previously, and, as now formulated, his revisionary 
triad would seemingly be harder to assimilate to more conventional notions of 
the dialectic as drawn from Hegel or Marx. In this fashion, Bloom gives more 
coherence to his baroque theoretical meditations and defends them against pos-
sible critiques from deconstructive sources. For deconstructors delight in nothing 
more than exploding the progress of the dialectic wherever it is operative by ex-
posing its specious logic. (Actually, of course, Bloom's self-revision here makes 
his position even more open to such a critique than before, but space prohibits 
going into this matter at this time; for the best work on Bloom of this de-
constructive kind, see the first chapter of Paul Boves Destructive Poetics: H ei-
degger and Modern Ame1'ican Poetry, [New York: Columbia University Press, 
1980]). 
For me, the highlights of the volume are Bloom's readings of Freud. (The 
essays on Emerson and Whitman, the one a hymn in_ praise of self-alienation, the 
other a celebration of the poetic power of masturbation, while certainly ex-
travagant, are too flashy even for my contemporary tastes). Bloom is at his best 
when he is reading texts closely, with a reverence for the author that inspires in 
him a concern for the more traditionally moral aspects of critical analysis. No-
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where does this humanistic side of Bloom appear more poignantly than in the 
dimas of his reading of Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle in "Freud's Con-
cepts of Defense and The Poetic Will ": 
Freud concluded "that the death drives are by their nature mute and 
that the clamour of life proceeds for the most part from Eros." Can we 
interpret this as meaning that wounded narciSSIsm becomes physical ag-
gression because the loss of self-esteem is also a loss in the language of 
Eros? Wounded narcissism is at the origins of poetry also, but in poetry 
the blow to self-esteem strengthens the language of Eros, which defends 
the poetic will through all the resources of troping. Lacking poetry, the 
sado-masochist yields to the literalism of the death-drive precisely out of 
a rage against literal meaning. When figuration and sarlo-masochism are 
identified, as in Swinburne or Robinson Jeffers, then we find always the 
obsession with poetic belatedness risen to a terrible intensity that plays 
out the poetic will's revenge against time by the unhappy substitution 
of the body, another's body or one's own, for time. Raging against time, 
forgetting that only Eros or figuration is a true revenge against time, the 
sado-masochist over-literalizes his revenge and so yields to the death-
drive .... Against the literalism and repetition of the death-drive, Freud 
sets, so early on, the high figuration of his poetic will to an immortality. 
Perhaps that may seem some day the truest defintion of the Freudian 
Eros: the will's revenge against time's "it was" is to be carried out by 
the mind's drive to surpass all earlier achievements. Only the strongest of 
the poets, and Sigmund Freud, are capable of so lummous a vision of 
Eros. (pp. 142 and 144) 
Listening to this quiet but strongly vital love for Freud and his wisdom of trUly 
inventive sublimation, one begins to hope that the promised book, Transference 
and Authority, may deliver our most representative critic from his literal bond-
age to the Primal Abyss of the Gnostics. 
DANIEL O'HARA 
Temple University 
Donald Barthelme: The Ironist Saved From Drowning by Charles Molesworth 
Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1982. Pp. 89. $8.00, paper. 
Here, in Charles Moleswonh's version of it, is Barthelme-as-parodist, the 
builder of collage-pieces, saving himself from drowning II in a world of fragments 
by his ironic manipulation of them. And he is saved from drowning in his own 
irony by a commitment to those fragments as the saving reality." This is a 
clear, coherent argument. wise to all of the conceptual dangers. Or at least most 
of them: notice how, in the sentence I have just quoted, "irony" and "commit-
ment" keep slipping up against one another and finally produce" saving reality" 
as their offspring. In this particular game, the critical-fictional stakes are very 
high; "saving reality," after all, is a fonn of redemption. It is to Molesworth's 
credit that he raises all the right questions and does so in a beautifully written and 
intelligent way, but it is no surprise that he does a bit of drowning himseH be-
fore his shan book is over. 
I j 
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The customary question about Barthelme is how important he is, given his 
microminiaturization of materials and styles. Molesworth addresses ths question 
but wisely connects Barthelrne to issues in visual art, post-structural criticism, 
and social thought. Barthelme's importance thus has to do with his canny stra-
tegic choices, in being careful not .to commit himself to subjects or styles that 
cannot carry the weight of critical thought. Performance carries the weight of 
critical thought, Barthehne's performance. So the feeling in Barthelme's work is, 
like the subject, condensed and concentrated, and Molesworth's term for this 
condensation is "affective overloading." To my knowledge, he is the first to 
observe that Barthelme's work has so much feeling that the feeling itself tends 
to disrupt the style. 
Without giving readings of the stories or novels, Molesworth outlines four main 
types of Barthelme's fiction, eloquently discusses one story, "Daumier," and, in 
a witty and eloquent aside, repositions Robert Frost as a radically ambiguous poet, 
comparable to Wallace Stevens or John Ashbery. All the central aesthetic issues 
are here. Molesworth's tone is both sophisticated and straightforward. 
But the book feels as though it is in some sort of strait-jacket, in part because 
of the size of the issues Barthelme (and Molesworth) can raise. Start with irony. 
Molesworth is more optimistic about it than Barthehne is. For Molesworth, the 
stories themselves create in symbolic fonn a saving reality. But there is no sav-
ing reality in the stories, and in "Kierkegaard Unfair to Schlegel," the voice-
ir.onic though it is-says that irony gives only a poor and unsatisfactory pleasure. 
Compared t.o someone like Ashbery, Barthelme seems more grim and more human 
because he will not transform the materials of his art into something imaginatively 
transcendent. Unlike Ashbery, he does not become a crypto-aesthete. His posi-
tion remains more radical because he refuses to take a leap toward uanscendent 
form. In all his work, Barthelme has wished to preserve the forms of his failure. 
This is a truly radical choice, an unromantic one, and it has made him completely 
aware of the commodification of outrage and irony in m.odern society. While 
Barthelme is packaged as a "successful" writer, his irony disallows any success 
within the stories; he will not even privilege interiority, as Beckett does. What 
the irony does, finally, is to act as a dreck detector. In Barthelme's world (see 
Snow White) there is only dreck, and so one's only strategy is to protect oneself 
from it. Is this a saving reality? It is safe, but nothing else. As a poet and critic, 
Moleswonh knows exactly how crucial these questions are, but his book has the 
appearance of an outline, and the more radical of his observations glide by too 
swiftly. It is as if M.olesworth himself had become the victim of packaging, in the 
telegraphic fonnat of the Missouri II literary frontiers" editions. 
CHARLES BAXTER 
Wayne State University 
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Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage by Stanley Cavell, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England; Harvard University Press, 
1981. Pp. xvi + 304. $19.95. 
Seven of the nine chapters of this book are devoted to readings of individual 
examples of a new genre Stanley Cavell calls the Comedy of Remarriage. These 
include Howard Hawks' Bringing Up Baby and His Girl Friday, George Cukor's 
The Philadelphia Story and Adam's Rib, Frank Capra's It Happened One Night, 
Leo McCarey's The Awful Truth and Preston Sturges' The Lady Eve. Cavell has 
unearthed these films from their usual generic resting places-the "Screwball" 
and "'Romantic" comedies-and mounted them in a new relationship to one 
another after reading Northrop Frye on Shakespearian romance. Following a 
tradition from Elizabethan romantic comedy, these films "show a young pair 
overcoming individual and social obstacles to their happiness, figured as a con~ 
eluding marriage that achieves individual and social reconciliations." As Cavell 
understands him, Frye distinguishes between Old Comedy and New, according to 
whether the drama emphasizes the struggle of a young man against an older 
onc or whether the emphasis is primarily upon the heroine. Because they feature 
the ,voman's conflict rather than the man's, Cavell's movies are "more intimately 
related to Old Comedy than to New, but [they are] significantly different from 
either [because they] seem to transgress an important feature of both, in casting 
as the heroine a married woman." Thus, Cavell argues, the Hollywood version 
marks a new stage in the history of the romantic comedy because the central 
problem in these films is not so much to get the pair together as it is to get them 
"together again." And the marriage which provided resolution in the Shake-
spearian comedy must here be understood conditionally, as "it is subjected to the 
fact or the threat of divorce." 
It might be objected that It Happened One Night, Bringing Up Baby and The 
Lady Eve do not qualify for membership in "Comedy of Remarriage," since in 
each of -them the couple is newly met. It could similarly be pointed out that 
Adam's Rib lacks the problem of divorce. But Cavell deflects such possible criti-
cism by defining genre in a. special way: 
It will be natural in what follows, even irresistible, to speak of individual 
characteristics of a genre as "features" of it; but the picture of an ob-
ject with its features is a bad one. An alternative idea ... is that a nar-
rative or dramatic genre might be thought of as a medium in the visual 
arts might be thought of, or a fonn in music ..• the members of a 
genre share in the inheritance of certain conditions, procedures and sub~ 
jects and goals of composition, and . . . each member of such repre~ 
sents a study of these conditions. . .. There is, on this picture, nothing 
one is tempted to call the features of a genre which all its members have 
in common. 
In privileging <l conditions and procedures" over features, Cavell gains a certain 
freedom as he moves between discussions of individual works and descriptions 
of the larger generic text. For example, in reading those films which do not ex-
plicitly treat the subject of remarriage Cavell has discovered that the divorce-
reconciliation conflict is only one possible emploonent of a. larger narrative, 
d 
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which could be called the myth of estrangement: U Let us think of the common 
inheritance of the members of a genre as a story, call it a myth. The members 
of a genre will be interpretations of it, or to use Thoreau's word for it, revisions 
of it, which will also make them interpretations of one another." 
The myth common to all the fihns in this book can be loosely constructed in 
trus way. 
A running quarrel is forcing apart a pair who recognize themselves :as 
having known one another forever, that is from the beginning, not just 
in the past but in a period before there was a past, before history. This 
naturally presents itself as their having shared childhood together, sug-
gesting that they are brother and sister. They have discovered their 
sexuality together and find themselves required to enter trus realm at 
roughly the same time they are required to enter the social realm, as if 
the sexual and the social are to legitImize one another. This is the begin-
ning of a history, of an unending quarrel. The joining of the sexual and 
the social is called marriage. Something evidentally internal to the task 
of marriage causes trouble in paradise-as if marriage, which was to be 
a ratification, is itself in need of ratification. 
Cavell argues that in this "new" old comedy the central characters are not so 
much struggling against external obstacles as they are pitted against one an-
other and their recognition in each other of their failure to endure intimacy. 
Resolution of the problem occurs when the couple achieve a new perspective 
on their situation, usually from the vantage point achieved in a flight to an iso-
lated and enchanted place. (Oddly, Cavell notes, in several of these Hollywood 
comedies the Forest of Arden !Urns out to be in Connecticut.) The removal to 
Eden is also movement out of time, enabling the lovers to "forgo and forget 
their past state and: its impasse of vengefulness ..• " and to reenter the sphere of 
sexuality free from the memory of crippled desire. Thus understood, any film 
about lovers who exhibit a natural antagonism to one another can be included 
in the genre. For Cavell, the rich versus poor opposition between the Gable and 
Lombard characters in It Happened One Night or the conflict between the re-
pressed intellectual and the madcap society girl in Bringing Up Baby are both 
enactments of a drive toward union held in check by the memory of frustrated 
intimacy. This is true because it is not the static features of divorce or marriage-
presences in the films similar to such generic icons as fancy cars and stately man-
sions-which define the genre, but the fact that the several texts are animated by 
a common goal of composition, in this case the elaboration of the problematic 
of contradictory attraction and repulsion. 
Cavell's understanding of genre as dynamic enables him to make interesting 
connections as he accounts for the many variances in these texts. For example, 
he argues that the previous marriage ostensibly missing from It Happened One 
Nigbt is actually acted out in the famous H Walls of Jericho" sequence in the 
cabin of the motor court. In that scene the couple live through an enforced 
intimacy without sex which replicates the false start toward sexual union the 
reunited divorcees in the other films have atttmpted. Thus, later in the film the 
pair can look hack to a period in their relationship which was apparently a 
marriage-they have pretended to be husband and "'Nife to avert their pursuers-
and this experience of a common past "'Nithout sex makes possible their second 
" truer" union. 
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The critic does not limit his creative reading -to the search for simple substitutes 
for the missing fcarnres of the genre. Through the use of an operation he calls 
" compensation" Cavell occasionally discovers new elements in places where he 
had been looking for old ones. For example, he observes that in It Happened 
One Night the lovers never manage an escape to Eden. Instead they a spend all 
their time together travelling from Florida to New Yark, a fact which has 
encouraged most critics to make the more obvious judgment that this is a "road 
film." Cavell includes It Happened One Night in his genre by arguing that in 
this instance the remarriage comedy compensates fOT the absence of the new 
pell'spective achieved in an escape to Eden by providing the central pair with 
a common "commitment to adventurousness, say to a future together no matter 
what." Within Cavell's understanding of the way genres function, this confla-
tion of a memory of the past with a faith in the future proves useful beyond the 
text of the film in which he first encounters it. Moving from text to system 
he discovers" that adventurousness in tum plays a role in each of the other fihns 
of remarriage and (that) one may come to think that a state of perspective does 
not require representation by a place but may also be understood as a matter of 
directedness, of being on the road, on the way." This rule of compensation is 
so important that it has a prescriptive power as well as a descriptive function; 
in a subsequent operation Cavell eliminates Sidney Franklin's Private Lives and 
Mervyn Leroy's Random Harvest, both films about the reunion and prospective 
remarriage of divorced couples, because these movies lack the definitive char-
acteristic of adventurousness in the play between the twO lovers. 
Cavell's discussion of genre merits so detailed an explanation because it is the 
most valuable section of this otherwise truly vexing book. Presumably, this way 
of understanding genre has facilitated his discovery of the Comedy of Remar-
riage, a class of films hitherto undiscussed by film scholars and one which Cavell 
has not invented. But the discovery of a new set of films with thematic similari-
ties and the occasional provocative insght do not compensate for the many short-
comngs of Pursuits of Happiness. For several reviewers the problem has been 
Cavell's overburdening of these frail Hollywood vessels with the weight of heavy 
ideas-his discussion of The Philadelphia Story in tenns of Milton1s "Doctrine 
and Discipline of Divorce," his reading of His Girl Friday in the context of 
Locke's" Second Treatise of Government," and his examination of The Awful 
Truth in the light of Nietzsche's Zarathustra, to name a few examples. But this 
is not really the problem. Films deserve to be discussed with as much serious-
ness as anything else. The problem is that Cavell fails to make 'lny of these link~ 
ages telling. moving as he does so breezily from philosophical treatise to Holly-
wood text that both the written words and the filmed images become secondary 
to the author's performance in bringing them together. The final result -is that 
the reader begins to suspect, as Michael Wood has phrased it, that U the object 
of Cavell's focussed interest" is not the text he purports to be reading but" what-
ever floats into ... consciousness." 
Related to this failure to focus steadily upon the text is Cavell's failure to con~ 
nect his argument to any work on film not written by Stanley Cavell. In the 
first: chapter. ingenuously titled" Words for a Conversation,1' all six: references to 
other discussions of movies refer to Cavell's previous writings. In the 263 pages 
which make up the bulk of the volume he cites other film scholars only six times, 
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almost always simply to acknowledge a point of infonnation received. By con-
trast the book is dense with long digressions in the text and lengthy footnotes in 
which the author rehearses some point he has made elsewhere. Occasionally these 
directives read like advertisements, as when Cavell drops a note to explain that 
his applied criticism in the. new volume is meant to illustrate theoretical issues 
raised in The. World Viewed (which J. Dudley Andrew once described as "writ-
ten in isolation") and to explain further that he has already made this connection 
in an essay called II What Becomes of Things on Film." II Because not everyone 
will have ready access to the journal in which it appears (Philosophy and Litera-
ture) I should like to reproduce its final paragraph here . . .. n Were he to do 
this sort of thing only once or twice, it would not be so annoying. But Cavell 
indulges in it constantly. 
By his own admission Cavell's disregard for other film scholarship has been 
damaging. For example, in the appendix to this book he tries to COIUlect his 
criticism to that of Robert Warshaw, but expresses regret that he wrote The 
World Viewed "not having !mown in time of Walter Benjamin and his essays." 
This critical innocence is partcularly problematic because it appears in a book in 
which the author is at such pains to justify the seriousness of the study of the 
movies. After an introduction in which he announces that he U is not unaware 
of an avenue of outrageousness in considering Hollywood films in the light of 
major works of thought," he brings Kant, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein 
et al. to his analysis of the texts. Obviously, he means to show that films are 
serious; but equally obvious from the tone of his introduction and the evidence 
of his scholarship is the fact that film scholarship is not worthy of that same 
seriousness. Thus Cavell's conversation is not directed at anyone who may talk 
back, i.e. those scholars who have already thought about film and who would 
hardly be outraged by his "indecorous juxtaposition" of films and ideas. This 
is especially unfortunate because his methodology-discovery of a new element 
in a particular work, return to the other texts to discover some version of this 
element functioning in the various settings, redefinition of the entire "myth" to 
account for the new feature and so on until the model reaches a "expensive 
saturation "-is quite similar to that of those film scholars who have been in-
fluenced by Levi-Strauss. But Cavell never refers to Levi-Strauss in his remarks 
on methodology, mentioning the anthropologist simply to make specific points 
about individual films and using the tenn "structuralist" only in several offhand 
and disparaging remarks. This is a serious omission because Levi-Strauss has been 
widely employed by experts in film genre and is in fact routinely discussed in 
such undergraduate textbooks as Thomas Schatz' Hollywood GenTes. 
It seems likely that Cavell ignores conventional film genre criticism because 
most of it takes an explicitly social and historical slant. His scholarly insularity 
thus serves his philosophical position, which is to turn one's experience of the 
film in upon the self rather than out upon the world. He argues that II one must 
let the object or the work of your interest teach you how to consider it." This 
premise implies another, which is "that to take an interest in an object is to 
take an interest in one's experience of the object, so that to examine and defend 
my interest in these films is to examine and defend my interest in my own ex-
perience and in the moments and passages in my life I may have spent with 
them." The movement from object to subject begun in these :first two proposi-
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tions is completed in still another self-referential passage: "These remarks ... 
I retain here if for no other reason than that they say things not said elsewhere 
in this book about who I am, I mean who I is, who the I in this book is, how that 
figure thinks things over and why such a one takes film as something to think 
over." 
Even if one were to accept the dubious proposition that this exquisite self-
consciousness provides a fruitful method with which to engage a literary genre, 
it hardly follows that such an approach is very useful in a discllssion of genre 
movies. Types of films become genres, that is, they multiply, in proportion to 
their success at the box-office. In that way they are extraordinarily dependent 
for their continued existence upon their favorable reception by a large group of 
people, and in that way they can be considered to be "authored" by their audi-
ences as much as they are by the teams of individuals who make them. For this 
reason film genre critics have insisted upon the connection between their chosen 
texts and society. Consider, for example, two of the many anicles which deal 
with the same era as Cavell, Charles Eckert's piece on Marked Woman and 
Mark Roth's essay on the Warner Brothers musical, both of which examine 
thirties genre films in the context of the social conditions which produced them. 
Roth's linkage of the studio and Franklin D. Roosevelt illustrates the ways in 
which the Warners entertainment of this era successfully enlisted its audience's 
support for the New Deal. Ecken's work, in which he examines the convergence 
of several genres in a single film, might have been especially useful to Cavell be-
cause he uses a notion of structure not unlike that employed in Pursuits of H ap-
piness. By uncovering a series of layered oppositions in the text, Ecken tries 
to reveal the specific ways in which the content of a genre film "mediates" the 
ideological contradictions in the cultural sirnation which generates it. Despite hs 
promises to "account for" his genre, this is an operation which interests Cavell 
not at all. He much prefers to employ the long lens provided by Nonhrop Frye, 
and to telescope several centuries with a critical zoom-in from the age of Jonson 
and Shakespeare to that of Capra and Hawks. In the same way that the tele-
photo lens collapses the physical space between the viewer and the subject of 
the composition, Cavell's literary history seeks to erase the temporal gaps be-
tween the ages which produce the various comedies of remarriage. 
Not surprisingly, this erasure of history leaves a few gaps in the argument. At 
one extraordinary juncture, seemingly aware that his criticism fails to explain 
the Godzilla-like emergence of his genre out from under the ice of several epochs, 
Cavell decides to search for" '3 comedic precedent for the remarriage form more 
specific than the Shakespearian." He finds that missing link II in Ibsen, and more 
particularly, in I A Doll House'" (sic). At another point, perhaps recognizing 
how extraordinary a formal genealogy he has laid out, Cavell turns away from 
literary history to a more specific explanation of the sudden flowering of his 
genre. Briefly sketching in the advances effected by women in the decades prior 
to the emergence of the Comedy of Remarriage, Cavell suggests that these films 
were made possible by the existence of a small set of women-Claudette Colbert, 
Irene Dunn, Katherine Hepburn, Rosalind Russell, Barbara Stanwyck-particular-
ly adept at playing the strong heroine the scripts demanded. In so doing Cavell 
moves from the collapsing temporal schema of Frye to a kind of " great woman " 
theory of history. 
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These improbable explanations of the genre disappoint because they follow an 
opening promise the author has made" to provide terms for understanding" why 
his films emerge and disappear in the years between 1934 and 1941. They irritate 
because they are offered as part of a conscious refusal to engage the texts as 
social artifacts: 
The explanation I have heard for this historical phenonenom-and it 
seems to have become something of a piece of folk w1sdom-is that 
thirties comedies were fairy tales for the Depression. . . . If luxurious 
settings and fantastic sums of money were confined to the Hollywood 
films of this period, and if Hollywood films of luxury and expenditnte 
were confined to works that fit the genre of remarriage, then I would 
be more drawn to an economic interpretation of the films I have in-
terested myself in, or to an explanation of genre by economic causation. 
Since the facts are otherwise it matters to me that that explanation does 
not specifically account for the fonn in question, 
This refutation of an <l argument he has heard" is not very illuminating. Since 
no scholar is named, no real engagement need take place. In addition, although 
he discusses it briefly, Cavell fails to consider the real history of the cinema in 
the decade of the thirties. The perfection of sound films in Hollywood at the 
end of the twenties, which immediately made the national origin of a film its 
most important commercial asset, guaranteed the worldwide preeminence of the 
Hollywood movie since the greatest number of motion picture houses were in 
English-speaking countries. Unlike that of any other national cinema, the Ameri-
can product paid for itself at home and turned a profit in dubbed versions over-
seas. This era of Hollywood's greatest expansion, which saw the natural de-
velopment of sound-dependent genres like the musical and the sophisticated 
comedy coincided with the era of the Great Depression. At the same moment 
that the novelty of the sound film attracted large audiences those audiences were 
concerned with economic issues in a newly intensified way. This information, 
of course, no more accounts for the genre than does Cavell's invocation of Ibsen, 
but a serious -and sensitive reading of the Remarriage Comedy could conceivably 
try to deal with the way in which certain Hollywood texts used, or plotted, or 
engaged, that specific desire in their audiences. For Cavell to shirk this task be-
cause other eras have also produced films about the monied is disappointing on 
several levels. For one, such a decision controverts his own argument; if the 
formal history of a genre is as important as he argues, then it seems natural that 
genres from Hollywood's most prolific period will continue to be imitated and 
placed in new settings. More important is the logical error in Cavell's suggestion 
that the appearance of settings of wealth and luxury in subsequent Hollywoodl 
movies precludes any discussion of <I economic causation." Obviously, the estab-
lishment of a simple cause and effect between the Depression and movies about 
wealth is reductive. But that hardly means that the critic should ignore these 
issues and go off in search of the phenomenal self in the text. It isn't as if, as 
Cavell's citation of the continued appearance of movies about money implies, 
the public's persistent interest in characters untouched by hunger and poverty 
invalidates all connectiom between the real suffering of the Depression and the 
Remarriage Comedy'S essential disinterest in that suffering. And it certainly does 
not follow that, because the poor are always with us, the denial of their signifi-
cance by the Remarriage Comedy bears no analysis. 
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Because he is an extraordinarily insightful critic, Cavell anticipates such an ob-
jection. In fact, it is one of the failures of this book that he is so concerned to 
antcipate all criticism that he frequently leaves the text to tilt with some inter-
locutor of his own imagining. In the particular instance at hand, however, he has 
conjured up an antagonist whose position anticipates my own. It occurs in a 
discussion of the" Depression vignette" in It Happened One Nigbt, when a 
a woman faints from hunger on a bus. Cavell's argument is that this is a film 
about" hungering, where hungering is a metaphor for imagining," and that Capra 
is "taking the occasion of the Depression to ask what it is we as a people are 
truly depressed by. what hunger it is from which we are all faint?" Cavell rea-
sonably asks if such an intention on Capra's part is morally irresponsible, like 
"aestheticizing or transcendentalizing human suffering." His answer is no, since '\ 
this is a criticism all serious art which tries to portray suffering must risk. He :,::,,; 
buttresses his point with a quotation. and his gloss of it, from Emerson: "Do ' 
not tell me, as a good man did today, of my obligation to put all poor men in 
good situations. Are they my poor? That is, it is not I who make them and who ',:1 •.. \
keep them poor; and so far as I can better the situation of whoever is poor I , 
can only do it by answering my genius when it calls. But to give this sort of 
answer one must have a healthy respect for the value of one's work. let us say r 
for its powers of instruction and redemption." However appropriate such a re-
sponse may be for Emerson, and however relevant it is to Frank Capra, it is 
difficult not to read this passage, given Cavell's scholarly self-reliance, as a de-
fense of his own work. It is equally difficult, given the relative infrequency of 
PU1'suits of Happiness's instructive and redemptive passages, to accord Cavell's 
book that respect he seems to be asking for. Not only does this book refuse to 
engage some of the most important questions raised by these films, it poses sev-
eral questions of its own. What drives the critic to perform these disabling op-
erations upon the texts? What is the institutional context which encourages the 
scholar to detach these movies-created by hundreds of people, consumed by 
thousands-so completely from their social functioning? What force in the aca-
demic situation demands that they be contemplated at so great a remove? 
DENNIS TURNER 
Wayne State University 
